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ABSTRACT
South Africa’s labour market is characterised by high unemployment but relatively low levels of 
informal employment, making it distinct from other developing countries. The existing literature 
appears to show evidence of high mobility rates of labour across labour market states. The coexistence 
of high labour mobility rates, yet high unemployment and weak informal employment in South Africa’s 
labour market is therefore puzzling. Considerable research has been done to explain this phenomenon 
and has suggested that barriers to informal entrepreneurship form the key reason why informal 
employment is relatively low in South Africa compared to other developing countries. Worker 
transitions have however not been a focal question in the literature. Using data from the National Tncome 
Dynamics Study (NTDS 2008-2012), this study sought to examine the characteristics of workers who 
move into informal employment, attaching importance to those who become self-employed. Transition 
matrices are constructed showing the proportion of workers who stayed or moved into different labour 
market states between 2008 and 2012, and linking the movements to 2008 personal characteristics. 
Churning between labour market states was found to be relatively high, albeit formal wage employment 
exhibiting immobility. Transitions out of informal employment were high, reflecting its survivalist 
nature. Conversely, those from unemployment into informal employment, particularly self-employment 
were low. Using the probit regression model, transitions to informal employment were found to be more 
associated with workers who are generally marginalised from formal employment opportunities. The 
results suggest that the South African labour market is to a larger extent not reflective of the Dualist 
narrative of ease of movement of workers from unemployment into informal employment and barriers 
into informal entrepreneurship are high. To date, policies which have sought to encourage informal 
entrepreneurship have not been a success. A central challenge to policymakers is to create an enabling 
environment for the unemployed to start their own informal businesses. This has the potential of 
reducing unemployment and poverty rates in the country.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
One cannot analyse and understand South African unemployment without talking about segmentation 
and about the informal sector and about entry and mobility barriers and about the impact of poverty 
conditions and about marginalisation. (Fourie and Leibbrandt 2012: 2).
South Africa’s labour market is characterised by high open unemployment but small informal 
employment, making it distinct from other developing countries (Kingdon and Knight 2004; Heintz and 
Posel 2008; Essop and Yu, 2008, Davies, 2010). As of 2010, the country’s informal employment 
contributed about 33 percent to total non-agricultural employment, while similar countries had rates of 
up to 81 percent as shown in appendix 1 (ILO, 2013: 9).1 The narrow and broad unemployment rates 
were approximately 26 percent and 33 percent, respectively, for Q3 2016 (Statistics SA, 2016). High 
levels of unemployment have implications for the degree and nature of labour mobility in South Africa’s 
labour market. We would expect low levels of voluntary exits from work and limited transitions to 
different types of work to characterise such a market since it would presumably not allow for easy 
mobility. Moreover, there would be presence of institutions that ‘protect’ jobs such as trade unions and 
strong social networks that penalise workers who try to gain at others expense, thus reducing instances 
of mobility.
In contrast to the assumptions above, several studies indicate significant rates of mobility of workers 
across employment statuses and types of employment in South Africa (Verick, 2011; Essers, 2013; 
Leung et al., 2014; Cichello et al., 2014). In particular, some studies show instances of high mobility in 
and out of informal employment to characterise the South African labour market (Cichello et al., 2005; 
Banerjee et al., 2008; Altman, 2008; Bargain and Kwenda, 2010; Valodia and Devey, 2010). Regardless 
of the observed high mobility rates into informal employment, informal employment has not been able 
to account for the surplus labour in South Africa as expected by Dualist theories of labour market 
segmentation.
Considerable research has been done which has sought to explain the puzzle of South Africa’s high 
unemployment and small informal employment. Other studies relate the small informal employment
1 South Africa’s informal sector (excluding private households) contributed about 20 percent to total non-agricultural employment for Q3, 2016 (Statistics 
SA, 2016: 6).
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size to under-capturing as a result of the definitional issues surrounding the term (Devey et al., 2003; 
Muller, 2003; Essop and Yu, 2008). Several studies identify significant barriers disabling workers 
transitioning from unemployment into informal entrepreneurship. These barriers include: lack of start­
up capital, insufficient government support through training and infrastructure provision; and a history 
of exclusion of black people from many categories of business under Apartheid (Chandra et al., 2001; 
Cichello, 2005; Ranchhod, 2006; Altman, 2008; Davies and Thurlow, 2010; Philip, 2011). Although 
there is considerable research on the relationship between South Africa’s informal employment and 
unemployment, the apparent paradox has not been explained. More generally, the question of mobility 
between states is underexplored. This raises an important question: Amidst barriers to entry, which 
types of workers have a higher probability of moving from unemployment into informal employment.
This thesis seeks to answer this question by shifting the interest from the conditions of the informal 
labour market and consider the effects of worker-level barriers to informal employment. This is done 
by looking at the individual characteristics of workers who moved from unemployment into informal 
employment between 2008 and 2012, albeit with a particular interest on those who became self­
employed in the informal sector. Informal self-employment for a developing country like South Africa 
is important for many reasons. Besides alleviating unemployment and improving the lives of 
impoverished households through entrepreneurship, it has long been argued that small enterprises are 
essential to economic growth (Schumpeter, 1934). Informal self-employment also plays a role in 
unlocking entrepreneurial potential (Guha-Khasnobis and Kanbur, 2006). In South Africa, the 
development and promotion of small businesses have been part of the country’s national strategy since 
democracy (DTI, 1995).2 Small, medium and micro enterprises have also been projected to be the ‘main 
employment creators’ in the government’s National Development Plan (NPC, 2012: 119).
The specific objectives of the study are as follows:
1) To examine the degree and nature of churning between different labour market states in South 
Africa.
2) To establish the degree of mobility of workers between unemployment and informal 
employment in South Africa.
3) To determine the correlation between worker characteristics and mobility between 
unemployment and informal employment.
2 The White paper mentions among other things, the need for the government to create an enabling legal framework, facilitate information and advice, 
boost procurement from small firms and improve access to finance and affordable physical infrastructure in its agenda to boost small businesses (DTI, 
1995).
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Identifying the characteristics of workers who make the transition from, for example, unemployment to 
informal self-employment will provide important information on whether and how the barriers to entry 
into this state may prevent it from becoming an avenue for income generation amidst high levels of 
open unemployment. Identifying the characteristics of individuals who make these transitions will help 
to suggest whether poverty-oriented or inequality-oriented policy analyses of unemployment and wages 
have engaged sufficiently with the importance of informal employment growth. Examining the 
characteristics that increase the likelihood of informal self-employment may prove valuable for 
designing and implementing policies that target and enable those workers who fail to make this 
transition.
The study hypothesises that, in light of barriers to entry into informal entrepreneurship discussed in 
South African literature, racial and geographical factors matter in explaining transitions to informal self­
employment, with African/black workers and workers residing in urban areas more likely to become 
informally self-employed than non-Africans/non-blacks and workers in rural areas. Lack of 
entrepreneurship resources in rural areas inhibits entrepreneurship while non-African/non-black 
workers are more likely to be formally employed. Transitions to informal self-employment are also 
expected to be skewed in favour of males than females due to general gender biases on provision of 
start-up finance. Transitions to informal self-employment are expected to increase with higher levels of 
education due to greater managerial abilities. Lastly, the study expects married/cohabiting workers to 
have a higher probability of becoming informally self-employed as compared to those who are not, as 
they are more likely to have better combined finances to run the business.
While the above ‘observable’ factors at play are expected to influence worker transitions into informal 
employment, it is important to note the possible existence of unobservable worker traits that might play 
a role in change of labour market status. Reasons other than purely worker characteristics differences 
play an important role in workers’ labour supply decisions and will also be explored in the paper.
To address the research questions, the study will make use of two waves (2008 and 2012) of the National 
Income Dynamics Study (NIDS). Transition matrices are constructed linking individuals’ labour market 
statuses in 2008 to their labour market statuses in 2012. The main interest is on those who moved from 
the unemployed state into informal employment, the different types of informal work and the 
characteristics of those who make the transition. Following this, a binary probit regression will be 
estimated in order to identify the effects of the individual characteristics on the mobility patterns, with 
a more pronounced interest on transitions into informal employment.
10
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 gives the theoretical and empirical background 
for the study. Chapter 3 describes the data, variable definitions, sample and the study’s methodology, 
following which Chapters 4 and 5 present and discuss the results. Chapter 6 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2:
CONTEXT OF RESEARCH
A range of alternative definitions of the informal sector have been employed in the literature, ranging 
from enterprise registration, social security protection and the characteristics of the employer. Often, 
data availability dictates the definition and measurement of this sector. In some cases, the term ‘informal 
sector’ has been used interchangeably with ‘informal employment.’ However, the informal sector only 
captures one type of activity in informal employment -  work that takes place in unincorporated 
enterprises that are unregistered or small (WIEGO, 2016). On the other hand, informal employment 
includes the informal sector and employment that is not covered by legal and social protection (United 
Nations, 2010). The first section of this chapter provides a theoretical insight of the informal sector by 
discussing the different schools of thought on the causes of the informal sector, its main actors, 
relationships with the formal sector and policy responses by the government towards its existence or 
elimination from the economy. The second section discusses the voluntary and involuntary nature of 
the informal sector. The third section of the chapter reviews which schools of thought are applicable to 
South Africa’s labour market as well as whether it comprises workers who enter it voluntarily or 
involuntarily. The fourth section provides a theoretical framework for worker transitions from 
unemployment into self-employment in the informal sector by discussing the main arguments behind 
how worker characteristics and the theory of utility maximisation may influence transitions into self­
employment in the informal sector. The succeeding sections will then discuss South Africa’s stance on 
entrepreneurship in the informal sector as well as local literature on informal sector transitions and how 
the current study seeks to fill up a research gap.
2.0 Schools of Thought on Informal Sector
Discussions on informality can be traced back to economic theories, prominent in the 1950s, of the 
‘traditional sector.’ Economists such as Arthur Lewis believed that the informal sector comprised of the 
vast pool of surplus labour in developing countries, which would gradually be absorbed into the modern 
industrial sector as these economies grew (Lewis, 1954). In the following decades, there was an on­
going debate about the nature and causes of the informal sector. The theoretical literature on the informal 
sector can be grouped into three well-known schools of thought, namely: Dualism, Legalism and 
Structuralism and more recent approaches called Voluntarism and Illegal production. These schools of 
thought differ in their identification of the causes of the informal sector, its main actors, its relations
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with the formal economy and suggested policy responses by the government towards its existence or 
elimination from the economy.
The Dualist theory
Dualist theories have been used to explain issues such as economic development, unemployment and 
the informal sector (See Lewis, 1954; Harris and Todaro, 1970). The Dualist theory views the informal 
sector as autonomous activities with very few (if any) links with the rest of the economy but rather 
operates as a distinct and separate sector of the economy; and that the informal workforce- assumed to 
be largely self-employed- comprises the less advantaged sector of a dualistic or segmented labour 
market (Chen, 2012: 5). Its activities provide income for the poor and a safety net in times of crisis. Its 
emphasis is on the traditional and survivalist nature of informal activities. However, even within 
Dualism, there are variant views in terms of how the informal sector arises. On one hand, classical 
Dualists such as Lewis (1954) argue that informal activities result from workers’ exclusion from modern 
economic opportunities due to imbalances between the growth rates of the population and of modern 
industrial employment; and due to a mismatch between people’s skills and the structure of modern 
economic opportunities (Chen, 2012: 5). On the other hand, neo-classical Dualists such as Todaro 
(1970) argue that informal activities arise because of distortions in the labour market (such as minimum 
wages) which lead to reduced labour demand by ‘formal’ firms. Although the mechanism in which the 
informal sector arises is seen to be different from a classical and neo-classical view, the result is the 
same: a residual informal sector.
The persistence of peasant forms of production shapes the underlying factor that influences this causal 
theory. The classical dualist theory of labour market segmentation postulates the economy as consisting 
of two different segments, namely, the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ sectors, with different wages paid to 
comparable workers (Fields, 2004). Formal sector activities are characterised by difficult entry, frequent 
reliance on overseas resources, corporate ownership, large scale of operation, capital-intensive and often 
imported technology, formally acquired skills - often expatriate, and protected markets (through tariffs, 
quotas and trade licenses). On the other end, the informal sector is characterised by low barriers to entry, 
reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership of enterprises, small scale of operations, labour­
intensiveness and adapted technology, skills acquired outside of the formal school system; and 
unregulated and competitive markets (International Labour Office, 1972: 6).
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Regulatory interventions such as minimum wage legislations, the market power of workers, or other 
imperfections in the formal wage labour market, cause wage rigidity in the formal sector, keeping them 
above market-clearing levels and also protecting workers from being laid off (Bosanquet and Doeringer, 
1973; Harrison and Sum, 1979). Employers pay that wage either to increase the productivity of workers, 
avoid payment of funds from non-compliance, or provide concessions to unions (Maloney, 1999). An 
increase in the minimum wage would create an even larger gap between the formal sector wage and the 
market wage as employers substitute skilled workers or capital for their existing labour force or even 
close their firms, thereby leading to a greater dislocation of workers from the formal sector (Brenos, 
2006: 31). In addition, distortions introduced by government regulation or strong labour unions, accord 
significantly different opportunities and rewards to otherwise comparable groups of workers, and 
earnings levels in the informal sector are lower than in the formal sector even after taking ability into 
account (Taubman and Wachter, 1986). Such workers would be left with a few options: either to leave 
the labour market, be unemployed or join the informal sector as labour demand in the modern/formal 
sector is insufficient to employ all who would like to work in that sector at the prevailing wage (Fields, 
2006: 3). Thus, in the Dualistic labour market approach, working in the informal sector is an involuntary 
solution to unemployment. In this sense, self-employment is more of a survivalist nature- either be self­
employed and earn something, or remain unemployed and earn nothing, of which workers in developing 
countries are too poor to remain unemployed and earn nothing.
Dualists argue that there is limited mobility between the formal and informal sectors. High levels of 
unemployment result in fewer offers of salaried employment, and thus many individuals will prefer self­
employment to spending long periods inactive or searching for work (Packard, 2007). The Dualists view 
the informal sector as a ‘residual sponge’ which absorbs that part of the growing labour force that cannot 
be employed in the more productive and remunerative urban sector (Ruffer and Knight, 2007: 3). 
According to classical Dualists, with the rise of industrialization, surplus labour would eventually 
disappear as the formal sector employs cheaper labour from the informal labour markets (Sherifat, 2011: 
626). Thus from their standpoint, the growth of the informal sector is a sign of economic failure, and 
policies are needed to reduce poverty within it (Ruffer and Knight, 2007: 3). Informality is seen as a 
problem to be solved and not a development strategy to be harnessed and promoted. It is not seen as an 
area of economic growth or dynamism, nor is it characterised as a reservoir of entrepreneurial training 
and talent (Sherifat, 2011: 626).
Developing countries inherently pass through a robust market driven process of economic development. 
The modern sector eventually absorbs all surplus labour from the traditional sector (Lewis, 1954). At
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this point, the economy shifts from an extensive to an intensive development path (Fryer, 2014: 15). 
Informal work is then a transitory phenomenon while its ultimate fate is to be absorbed by the formal 
sector once the structural transformation is over. However, from a neo-classical view, as long as 
distortions in the labour market were present, the informal sector would persist. The Dualistic model, 
in which formal salaried jobs are rationed, predicts that the share of the self-employed will increase 
during recessions. The view predicts counter-cyclical movement in the rate of self-employment 
(Packard, 2007). Policy responses tend to be about governments creating more formal jobs, and 
providing financial and business development services to informal enterprises (ILO, 1972).
Rather than divide the labour market into two segments, alternative views emerged in the 1980s and 
1990s, proposing more complex views of informality and the fragmented nature of the entire labour 
market. These approaches are commonly known as the Structuralists and the Legalists schools of 
thought. Both use the idea that the informal sector is composed of small and unregistered firms, but they 
make different interpretations of the processes generating informality and of the link between formal 
and informal sectors.
The Structuralist theory
In response to the Dualists’ failure to acknowledge the availability of informal workers in job creation, 
creative enterprises and capital accumulation, the Structuralist theory was introduced. It is labelled 
‘Structuralist’ because its concern is with the structure of formal-informal relationships as part of a 
unified economic system. Rather than the existence of two distinct economies where one is seen as a 
reflection of economic development, while the other as a symptom of economic failure, Structuralists 
emphasise the linkages which exist between the two economies. The theory describes the functions that 
are played by the informal sector in support of modern capitalist accumulation, specifically with regard 
to the potential of the informal sector to lower labour costs within the formal sector (Kay, 2011: 13).
Manuel Castells and Alejandro Portes (1989) view the informal sector as subordinated economic units 
(informal enterprises) and workers that serve to reduce input and labour costs of large capitalist firms. 
Its participants focus on petty trade and production, sub-contracted workers and casual workers. This 
approach considers the interactions between formal and informal sectors, whether in buyer-seller 
relationships, distribution, or in employment relationships such as contracting out or casualization 
(Chen, 2006; Altman, 2008). This benefits formal capitalist enterprises with a subsidy that allows them 
to keep wage costs lower than it would be if worker consumption occurred entirely within formal
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markets. In addition, it lowers the cost of consumption and increases the purchasing power of the urban 
middle class (Kay, 2011: 13). The informal sector also provides a supply of unprotected labour, through 
off-the-books hiring and subcontracting, allowing formal sector firms to avoid labour regulations 
(Portes and Schauffler, 1993).
A major contribution of the Structuralist theory is that it recognises that the informal sector is 
heterogeneous, containing an ‘upper-tier’ and ‘lower-tier’ of workers (Fields, 2005: 25). Earlier 
proponents of the theory separate the sector into two groups based on workers’ motivation and goals: 
one which is subordinate to formal sector enterprises/registered firms and motivated by labour cost 
reduction, while the other one has subsistence goals (Castells and Portes, 1989). These groups further 
reflect a segment of informal micro-entrepreneurs with access to some capital and labour resources, and 
one with unprotected workers who involuntarily eke out a subsistence wage (Fields, 1990; Portes and 
Schauffler, 1993).
Another contribution to informal sector thinking that the Structuralist theory brought is that in contrast 
to a classical Dualistic model that views the informal sector as the traditional economy that will wither 
away and die with modern, industrial growth, Structuralists view the sector as ‘here to stay’ and 
expanding with modern, industrial growth (Chen, 2006: 45). Therefore, informality ceases to be a 
transitory feature of a segment of the economy, to become instead a phenomenon that crosses sectoral 
borders and a necessity for the capital system as a whole (Basile and Harris-White, 2010: 5). Policy 
responses tend to target the institutional framework and political context in which the informal economy 
operates, that is, they are more focused on governments regulating both commercial and employment 
relations to address the unequal relationship between ‘big businesses’ and subordinated producers and 
workers (Women in Informal Employment, Globalising and Organising, 2015).
The Legalist theory
Introduced by Hernando De Soto in 1989, the Legalist school views the informal economy as a rationale 
response to over-regulation in the formal economy. Legalists view the economy as comprised of plucky 
entrepreneurs who choose to avoid the unnecessary and burdensome costs, time and effort of formal 
registration and who need legal rights to convert assets into formal property (De Soto, 1989). The 
Legalistic school argues that the informal sector is a result of a hostile reception, especially from the 
legal system, that leads to informal activities and extra-legal norms. In addition, costs of becoming 
formal such as registration and license lead to workers opting for informal entrepreneurship. There are
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also costs of remaining formal such as taxes and compliance with regulations or laws and higher rates 
for public utilities (WIEGO, 2015). Therefore, according to this view, workers move freely between 
formal and informal employment and they weigh the benefits of working formally against those of 
working informally, selecting the form of employment with the greater net benefits (Loayza and 
Rigolini, 2006). In this view, micro-entrepreneurs would continue to produce informally so long as 
government procedures are cumbersome and costly in terms of bureaucracy, lack of property rights and 
difficult accessibility to resources such as finance and technology (De Soto, 1989). Policy responses 
from a Legalistic view are about governments introducing simplified bureaucratic procedures to 
encourage informal enterprises to register and extend legal property rights for the assets held by informal 
operators in order to unleash their productive potential and convert their assets into real capital (Chen, 
2012: 5-6).
As with other theories, the three views discussed above have their critique. In terms of Dualism’s 
argument of a superior formal sector and an inferior informal sector, some statistics do not support this 
assumption, as there is growing evidence in some countries of wages of workers in the informal sector 
exceeding those of formal sector workers with same observable characteristics. This is particularly 
notable for those who are self-employed. In some developing countries, the self-employed have been 
seen to be earning competitive incomes (Vijverberg, 1986; Marcoullier et al., 1997; Maloney, 1999; 
Kwenda, 2009), while in developed countries, several studies have shown that the decision to become 
self-employed is driven by a positive expected earnings differential between salaried and self­
employment (Rees and Shah, 1986; Dolton and Makepeace, 1987; Evans and Leighton, 1989). In 
addition, non-monetary factors may also make informal self-employment more desirable than formal 
wage employment. These factors include greater flexibility, independence, entrepreneurial 
achievement, job satisfaction or an appetite for risk. This can explain the frequent voluntary movement 
between the formal and informal sectors observed in some countries like Brazil and Mexico (See 
Maloney, 1999). Another critique to the Dualism narrative is that there is virtually no evidence that 
informal firms disappear completely due to development (Altman, 2008: 9). Pratap and Quintin (2006) 
show that informal output accounted for about 10 or 15 percent of official GDP in most developed 
economies.
A critique to the Structuralist theory is that against its assumptions of linkages between the formal and 
informal sectors, there are some formal firms which operate independent of informal firms for example 
large firms experiencing economies of scale may not need to rely on cheaper inputs from informal firms.
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A critic to Legalist theory is its assumption of choice in movement between formal and informal sectors 
as it pays little attention to impediments to formality.
The Voluntarist theory
Introduced by William Maloney (2004), the Voluntarist theory views the informal economy as 
comprised of entrepreneurs who choose to operate informally in order to avoid taxation, commercial 
regulations, electricity and rental fees, and other costs of operating formally. Proponents of the theory 
argue that the sector is a result of informal operators who choose to operate informally-or even 
criminally- after weighing the costs and benefits of informality relative to formality. Unlike the Legalist 
school, this school does not blame cumbersome registration procedures but says informality is a 
deliberate choice by entrepreneurs to enjoy benefits of informality (Maloney, 2004). The Voluntarists 
pay relatively little attention to the economic linkages between informal enterprises and formal firms 
but subscribe to the notion that informal enterprises create unfair competition for formal enterprises 
because they avoid formal regulations, taxes, and other costs of production. They argue that informal 
enterprises should be brought under the formal regulatory environment in order to increase the tax base 
and reduce the unfair competition to formal businesses (Chen, 2012). Patrap and Quintin (2006) find 
that the tax burden, weak rule of law, government corruption and heavy bureaucracy associated with 
registration, weak security of property rights and the quality of the legal system that existed in Latin 
America, led to an informal sector typical of a Legalistic school of thought.
Illegal production
Often focused on transition and developed countries, in this approach, the informal sector is seen as 
illegal or hidden/underground production activities. The illegality refers to production activities which 
are forbidden by law or which become illegal when carried out by unauthorised producers; while 
underground production refers to production activities which are legal when performed in compliance 
with regulations, but which are deliberately concealed from authorities (Chen, 2012: 6). Illegal 
production activities can be carried out by both formal and informal firms. Hussmans (2004: 9) argues 
that most informal activities in developing and transitional countries are not underground or illegal but 
instead reflect a survival strategy for the person involved in them and their households.
Appendix 2 shows a comprehensive summary of the key attributes of the four dominant schools of 
thought. What is common about the debates above is that each theory focuses on a part of the informal
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economy and not the whole. For example, Dualists focus on those workers who are engaged in 
traditional and survival activities, while Structuralists focus on petty traders and producers as well as 
sub-contracted workers. Legalists and Voluntarists focus on informal enterprises and entrepreneurs. 
Those from the Illegal production approach focus more on entrepreneurs. There is a merit to each one 
of the theories due to the heterogeneity of the sector. The schools highlight different elements of the 
sector, yet they are not mutually exclusive (WIEGO, 2015). A core dividing line between the different 
theoretical perspectives on informality is the degree to which informal employment is assumed to be 
freely chosen and the extent to which it is assumed to be an outcome of constraints that limit 
opportunities and choice. Fryer (2014: 15) argues that there is no reason why the informal sector should 
not also contain a ‘residual’ traditional element and a ‘functional’ element. A key conclusive point is 
that the informal sector arises both voluntarily and as a survivalist form within and across countries. 
Several developing country studies have sought to establish whether the informal sector was 
predominantly voluntary or involuntary in its nature. In addition, some studies tried to test which schools 
of thought and models applied to specific cases.
2.1 Voluntary and involuntary informality
The nature of the informal sector in terms of whether it is voluntary or involuntary, is much dependent 
on the degree and forms of state intervention, as well as the influence of labour institutions in a country. 
Maloney (1999: 292) after analysing worker transitions between sectors, finds that the informal sector 
is a desirable outcome in itself for many Mexican workers. At least two-thirds of those entering the 
informal sector from formal salaried employment reported moving voluntarily. Higher pay in the sector 
and a desire for greater independence are mentioned as the motives for this movement, while 
institutional rigidities are to a lower extent, accountable for a smaller fraction of movement of workers 
to the informal sector. During the period examined, minimum wages were not binding and union power 
was weak. According to Ruffer and Knight (2007: 8), unions in Mexico have primarily been concerned 
about preserving employment rather than raising remuneration, while wages have shown downward 
flexibility. The informal sector in Mexico was therefore seen as an unregulated micro-entrepreneurial 
sector and not a disadvantaged residual. Alcaraz (2012) uses a simple model of self-selection with entry 
barriers into the formal sector, and estimated that between 10 and 20 percent of informal workers 
preferred to have a formal job. While this result provided evidence of the presence of some segmentation 
in the Mexican labour market, it suggested that an important proportion of workers in the informal sector 
self-select into it. However, the case of Mexico remains unsettled as an earlier study by Duval-
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Hernandez (2006) which takes a different approach to analysing micro-data in the same country, finds 
evidence that a large majority of urban informal workers in Mexico were involuntarily employed.
Carneiro and Henley (2003) show a widening wage differential between the formal and informal sectors 
of Brazil to be the cause of a fall in informality as more employees faced with a rising opportunity cost 
of remaining in the informal sector, opted to work in the formal sector making the former an involuntary 
alternative. However, the evidence in this country is also inconclusive. A study of Brazil’s labour market 
by Curi and Menezes-Filho (2006) shows that labour market transitions between the formal and 
informal sectors were associated with small wage decreases and increases in the sectors, thus reflecting 
a more voluntary nature of the informal sector.
Evidence from Argentina is more conclusive, Pratap and Quintin (2006) argue that the informal sector 
in Argentina has characteristics of voluntary employment and not of a segmented nature. In addition to 
observing that similar workers earned similar wages across the formal and informal sectors, informal 
workers were not relatively less satisfied with their jobs in comparison to formal workers. Also, informal 
workers were not found to be queuing for formal sector jobs as they expected lower wages in the formal 
sector. The study finds that in many cases, informal workers earned more than their formal counterparts 
earned, and therefore preferred to work therein compared to formal jobs.
A study on Colombia by Pena (2013), in addition to evidence of labour segmentation between the formal 
and informal sectors, finds that even in the prevalence of wage differentials favouring formal sector 
employees, there were few transitions from informal to formal employment while the flows from 
formality to informality were larger. Prada (2012) analyses the determinants of the transitions between 
sectors in the Colombian labour market and finds that the reason for the switch from formal to informal 
sector jobs was involuntary release from the former to the latter.
The Chinese informal sector is an example of involuntary employment. The Chinese formal sector is 
characterised by urban-born employees in the state and collective sectors, with wages and conditions 
institutionally determined. On the other hand, the informal sector is the inferior sector, subject to market 
forces and comprises of urban-born workers retrenched from their formal jobs. It also comprises of 
young city-dwellers, rural-urban migrants and rural workers employed in the rural industry (Ruffer and 
Knight, 2007: 4). The existence of an urban formal sector wage above that which is determined by the 
market, lures rural-urban migrants. However, when they are less jobs available relative to the influx of 
migrant workers, many workers end up entering the urban informal sector rather than be openly
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unemployed. Alternatively, they can secure employment in the formal sector on an informal basis. In 
addition, the involuntary informal sector in China rises because of the existence of institutions such as 
residence registration, which restrict the rights of migrants in the cities and protects urban-dwellers 
against the competition of rural people (Knight and Song, 1995; Ruffer and Knight, 2007). The result 
is a large informal sector in the city that is characterised by low incomes. Even though Chinese economic 
growth has been high, the informal sector has not fared with the passage of time.
Ruffer and Knight (2007) see informal employment in India as involuntary because of the existence of 
powerful institutions such as the All Indian Federation of Teachers Organisation (AIFTTO) that push 
for wages well above the market clearing levels while workers are also protected politically in respect 
to both pay and employment security. This view has been challenged however by Gurtoo and Williams 
(2007) who find that the larger proportion of informal workers in India were own-account workers, 
opportunity driven and operating informally not out of necessity, but due to the ease and comfort of 
operating in the system.
Cling et al., (2014) find evidence of involuntary employment in Vietnam as they find that informal 
sector workers had low job satisfaction. Besides higher salaries relative to informal counterparts, formal 
sector workers benefit from shorter working hours and better welfare protection in terms of social 
security, long-term contracts and paid holidays. The informal sector’s share of total employment has 
also been rising in Vietnam. In spite of the expanding formal sector, its growth is not high enough to 
absorb all the new arrivals on the labour market.
A study by Lehmann and Pignatti (2007) on the Ukrainian labour market finds that a large proportion 
of informal employees had been denied access to formal employment, which they preferred. The authors 
find high rates of movement of workers outflowing from informal employment to formal employment 
while transitions from unemployment to informal jobs were disproportionately large. The evidence 
infers that, if  at all possible, unemployed persons will try to find formal employment but were restricted 
from doing so, and hence entered into informal employment. This also provides some evidence that 
informal employment in Ukraine is a waiting stage and that people queue in this state for formal jobs. 
Even though the unemployment rate substantially fell between 2003 and 2004 because of strong growth 
on the Ukrainian economy, it did not result in an expansion of formal employment but was rather driven 
by growing informal employment (Lehmann, 2007: 22).
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Gunther and Launov (2006) find that the amount of workers in Cote d’Ivoire that would choose to enter 
the formal sector was significantly higher than the amount of workers actually employed in the formal 
sector. The amount of workers who were involuntarily employed in the informal sector was higher than 
the amount of workers that would voluntarily choose to stay in this segment.
A study on the Indian labour market by Narayanan (2015) that sought to test for labour market 
segmentation finds that workers could freely enter informal employment, however the study finds no 
evidence of self-selection into formal employment. The wage gap decompositions also showed that 
informal workers earned less than formal workers, not only because they were less skilled, but also 
because they faced discrimination as they received lower returns to their endowments compared to 
formal workers. The authors argue that this evidence showed that informal employment may not be a 
voluntary choice by Indian workers.
From the literature survey above, it can be seen that for some country cases, informal employment has 
been seen as voluntary, while in other cases, involuntary. For some countries, the debates have been 
non-conclusive. Arguing that workers are voluntarily informal does not, of course, imply that they are 
not in poverty, only that they would not obviously be better off in the formal jobs that they are qualified 
for. Maloney (2004: 3) argues that being in the informal sector is often the optimal decision given their 
preferences, the constraints they face in terms of their level of human capital, and the level of formal 
sector labour productivity in the country. Another issue concerning the nature of informal employment 
in countries is that the different compositions of involuntary or voluntary informal workers may only 
be temporary states and are capricious. Two cases to explain this conceptual issue were used as 
examples by Kucera and Roncolato (2008: 328): Less educated workers have more limited formal 
employment prospects, so consider what would happen if the level of education attainment were to 
increase in a country. In such a case, more workers would be qualified for good jobs in the formal sector 
and so fewer would contentedly settle for informal employment. That is, the ratio of voluntary to 
involuntary informal employment would be lower. On the other hand, if  the quality of formal jobs were 
to worsen, previously involuntary informal workers might now prefer to remain informal rather than 
seek formal employment. In this case, the ratio of voluntary to involuntary employment would be 
higher.
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2.2 The ‘upper-tier’ and ‘lower-tier’ segments of the informal sectors
The literature survey above also showed that evidence from diverse countries suggests that neither the 
orthodox Lewis-Todaro model, nor the Legalistic approach entirely fits in explaining the causes and 
persistence of informal work participation. Other studies show that informal labour markets (as in the 
Structuralist theory, which subscribes to the heterogeneity of the sector) often contain both voluntary 
and involuntary sub-sectors, although their relative shares can differ greatly from country to country. 
They often comprise an ‘upper-tier’ and a ‘lower-tier.’ Therefore, as labour segmentation exists between 
the formal and informal sectors, it also exists within the informal sector. It is very common for entry 
barriers to keep workers out of the more productive informal sector activities, with most of the residual 
labour force being forced into the ‘lower-tier’ (Ruffer and Knight, 2007: 10). Unlike those in the ‘lower- 
tier,’ individuals in the ‘upper-tier’ are more likely to have chosen to operate within the informal 
economy than to have been forced to do so. The characteristics of the ‘upper-tier’ and ‘lower-tier’ 
informal workers also differ. Fields (1990) found that in Costa Rica and Malaysia, many ‘upper-tier’ 
informal workers had previously worked in formal employment. Perhaps that is where they would have 
gained the necessary training, expertise and financial capital to start their own businesses. The ‘lower- 
tier’ jobs are better understood as a survival strategy for those excluded from the formal sector.
Ranis and Stewart (1999) also provide evidence of a segmented informal sector with links to the formal 
economy. Using data from Thailand and Philippines, they distinguish between the ‘traditional’ or 
‘stagnant’ sector of the informal economy and the ‘modernising’ or ‘dynamic’ sector. The former 
produces simple goods and services for low-income consumers, has few, if any, links with the formal 
economy, generates low incomes, has little, if  any, capital, requires only low-level skills, and is staffed 
primarily by family members. The ‘modernising’ sector of the informal economy, by contrast, produces 
more complex and more capital-intensive goods and services for the middle and upper classes and for 
customers within the informal economy. It requires higher skill levels. Incomes in this sector 
approximate or even exceed average incomes in the formal economy.
Gunther and Launov (2006: 18) formulate an econometric model that accounts for sample selection and 
sector multiplicity when sector affiliation of any particular observation is not necessarily observable, to 
learn about the composition of the urban labour market in Cote d’Ivoire. They find that the labour 
market was of a dichotomous structure with distinct wage equations and should not be regarded as one 
homogenous sector. Their results showed that one part of the informal sector was superior to the other 
in terms of higher earnings as well as higher returns to education and experience. After testing for
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evidence of market segmentation in the labour market, they find the existence of entry barriers to the 
formal sector for the ‘lower-tier’ informal sector, whereas comparative advantage considerations 
seemed to be the cause for the existence of the ‘upper-tier’ informal sector. Hence, the informal sector 
comprised of both individuals who are voluntarily informal and individuals for whom the informal 
sector is a strategy of last resort to escape involuntary unemployment. Fields (2005) argues that ‘upper- 
tier’ informal jobs in terms of utility are now almost indistinguishable from formal ones, while ‘lower- 
tier’ informal jobs constitute the ‘truly disadvantaged’ segment.
Gunther and Launov (2006: 19) suggest that from a policy perspective, it is important to take into 
account the latent structure of the informal labour market, because recommendations for the two distinct 
informal sectors are clearly different. Individuals who voluntarily participate in the informal sector just 
realise an opportunity to earn more than they would in the formal sector. However, as they still have 
much lower earnings than employees in the formal sector, policies have to increase their individual 
endowments to improve earning possibilities. With regard to the lower-tier informal sector, policy 
interventions have to counter entry barriers to the formal sector. Moreover, agents found in the 
involuntary part of the informal sector, show especially low earnings, which are also much lower than 
earnings in the ‘voluntary’ informal part. Therefore, if  the policy objective is to address the most 
disadvantaged, the ‘lower-tier’ informal sector should receive highest priority.
2.3 The informal sector of South Africa: Dualism, Structuralism and Segmentation
The South African informal sector fits into the Dualism narrative to some extent, yet a substantial part 
of its characteristics reflect a more Structuralist standpoint. In line with Dualism, employment in South 
Africa has been described to be characterised by ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders,’ the former being formal 
sector employees and, the latter being the unemployed labour force and the informal sector employees 
who fall outside the labour regulation systems such as trade unions, collective bargaining and protection 
against dismissals (Bhorat et a/.,2001;UNDP, 2003; Kingdon and Knight,2007; Heintz and Posel, 
2008). There has also been considerable literature that showed that working in the informal sector of 
South Africa was associated with a wage penalty as posed by the Dualist narrative (El Badaoui et a/., 
2008; Kwenda, 2009).
However, the Dualist theory does not seem fitting to the South African case in the following areas: 
Firstly, whilst the theory posits that workers who are disadvantaged from entering the formal sector can 
enter the less preferable informal sector (with lower barriers to entry), this has not occurred in the South
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African case. Its informal sector is small, amidst high levels of open unemployment. Secondly, the 
Dualist narrative argues that most of the workers in the informal sector will be self-employed, however, 
informal self-employment in South Africa has been seen to be smaller compared to informal wage 
employment (Chen, 2005; Wills, 2009; Fields, 2015). Thirdly, in contrast to the Dualistic view that 
posits for limited mobility of workers between the formal and informal sectors, South African literature 
appears to show significant rates of labour mobility between the two sectors (Banerjee et a/., 2008; 
Bargain and Kwenda, 2010; Valodia and Devey 2010).
There are a few possible explanations on why workers may have been seen to be shifting between 
sectors at rapid rates in South Africa’s labour market. Firstly, it might be spurious mobility. The shifting 
of definitions between surveys in South Africa leads to empirical uncertainty.3 The number of people in 
any category of employment can be changed by shifting definitions between surveys leading to 
uncertainty about how meaningful apparent ‘changes’ are. This makes it hard to be confident about 
‘trends’ and about how to interpret what appears to be labour mobility and ‘churning’ (that is, people 
changing labour market states)” (Fryer 2013: 8).
Secondly, it might be genuine churning between the sectors because of the sporadic and survivalist 
nature of informal work. This can take place from both a non-choice and choice framework. For 
example, in the case of the former, a person may be able to do something one day, but there may be no 
demand for it the next day. Furthermore, other people might have taken the opportunity to be informal 
where there are few or no alternatives (for example, car guards). Hence they would shift between the 
informal sector and unemployment or being out of the labour force. Employment in the informal sector 
has also been viewed as a passageway to the formal sector and as a temporary state where workers 
‘queue’ for formal sector jobs that pay more and are protected. The characteristics of a worker have an 
impact on probability of movement between formal and informal sector. Therefore, when personal 
characteristics change (for example, attaining better education), labour demand increases by formal 
employers for these once disadvantaged workers and they can transition to the formal sector. On the 
other hand, when characteristics change for formally employed workers (for example, increase in age), 
they might resort to informal work such as self-employment, as a source of income after retirement by 
‘choice.’ However, worker characteristics are usually stable over a short period of time, thereby making 
spurious mobility a more plausible explanation in South Africa.
3 Yu (2010) mentions how Statistics SA changed its definitions and questionnaire regarding employment in the informal sector with the introduction of the 
QLFS in 2008 that replaced the LFS.
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Thirdly, workers may have been seen to be supposedly churning between sectors because of 
‘measurement error.’ Individuals may reply differently in different periods (or proxy respondents may 
get it wrong) if the informality definition used is based on questions such as “social security coverage 
of workers” or if  respondents do not really view this as work. So depending on the probing of the 
interviewer, one may or may not pick up informality or may classify the person differently.
The theoretical shortcomings of the Dualistic perspective on South Africa’s labour market have led to 
a consensus by a number of authors who believe that the Structuralist theory is a better explanation for 
South Africa’s informal sector. As mentioned in earlier sections of the thesis, Structuralists recognise 
that linkages exist between the informal activities and the formal sector (Tokman, 1978; Castells and 
Portes, 1989). South African literature, which explores these linkages, confirming the Structuralist 
aspect of the economy, has emerged (Naidoo et a/., 2004; Skinner, 2005; Valodia and Devey, 2010). 
There is evidence of product linkages in South Africa. For example, Skinner’s study of informal 
enterprises in Durban provides some useful indicators of forward and backward linkages in the informal 
economy. Informal enterprises sourced raw materials from medium to large enterprises, a portion of 
these likely to be in the informal economy (for example, traditional medicines being supplied to 
informal enterprises by formal shops and foreigners). Some of these informal enterprises also sold some 
of their goods to formal and foreign businesses (Skinner, 2005). We can also mention about the taxi 
industry, which is mostly unregulated and has close linkages with the formal vehicle companies, petrol 
and insurance industries.
Labour churning between formal and informal sectors is also a form of a linkage that exists between the 
two sectors. This happens when ‘informal’ workers are employed in formal/registered enterprises or 
probably more unlikely cases where ‘formal’ workers are employed in informal/unregistered 
enterprises. Intra-household linkages also exist whereby there is a transfer of human and financial 
capital by the formally employed to self-employment activities since it is the households that have some 
form of regular income that are mostly involved in self-employment initiatives. This was observed by 
Lebani and Valodia (2005) using the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Survey.
The Structuralists also recognise the heterogeneity that exists in the informal sector itself, containing an 
‘upper-tier’ and ‘lower-tier’ segment. South Africa’s labour market is no exception to these divisions 
that exist within the informal sector. There is unemployment and a ‘tiering’ of jobs from most to least 
desirable. Many informal self-employment jobs are the least desirable and in any case, they are subject 
to extreme competition.
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In terms of its voluntary or involuntary nature, Ruffer and Knight (2007) argue that South Africa’s 
informal sector employment is involuntary because the formal sector is of choice and very few workers 
would prefer being employed in the informal sector as formal sector workers are protected by industrial 
regulations. These include the right to strike, protection against dismissal, minimum wages and 
minimum leave provision. The informal sector generally falls outside the labour regulation system, and 
informal sector wages, being more subject to market forces, are predictably lower. Kingdon and Knight 
(2007) find that informal sector wages in South Africa are about 60 percent of those in formal sectors.
2.4.1 Factors influencing transitions into informal self-employment: Observable characteristics
Different perspectives exist on the influence of gender on self-employment entry. Several mechanisms 
at work enable males or females to have a higher propensity to enter self-employment from being 
unemployed. Considering the argument that mentions a greater likelihood for males, a well-established 
fact points out that women are more financially risk averse than men (Verheul and Thurik, 2001; 
Borghans et a/., 2008; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Dohmen et a/., 2011). Thus, women are less prone to 
move to self-employment when it demands a significant amount of financial capital to be invested. A 
second rationale is related to social capital. M en’s social networks are diversified and include more 
powerful and work-centred contacts (Koellinger et a/., 2013). Family responsibilities and lower status 
jobs which are associated with females, reduce time to invest in networking and getting powerful work- 
related contacts respectively. Given the importance of social capital in self-employment, this represents 
an additional factor which reduces the propensity of women entering self-employment (Moog and 
Backes-Gellner, 2009). The lack of strong social networks also poses as a barrier to entry for women 
who would want to enter self-employment. Self-employment in many cases is an activity, which 
requires large workload and flexibility of hours. This makes it more difficult for women to be self­
employed, especially those with young children. This is also a factor which can make more men than 
women to enter self-employment (Joona and Wadensjo, 2008). Gender biases that exist in terms of 
access to credit necessary to start-up businesses may reduce the propensity for women to enter self­
employment because women lack the collateral that formal institutions require (Heinz and Pickbourn, 
2012: 189).
Alternative theories that suggest greater likelihood of self-employment entry for women mention the 
flexibility of working hours that characterises self-employment. According to Georgellis and Wall 
(2005), self-employment could be a substitute for a part-time job. As women on average take on a larger 
part of household work, their propensity to enter self-employment may be greater than men as they can
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combine household responsibilities with a job that has flexible working hours. Joona and Wadensjo 
(2008) mention that the alternatives as a wage earner may influence the propensity to become self­
employed. A labour market that gives more wage-job opportunities to men increases the likelihood of 
self-employment for women. The opposite is also true. Even within informal employment, where the 
Structuralist theory is evident, men are more likely to be employed in ‘better’ ‘upper-tier’ informal jobs, 
while women end up resorting to ‘lower-tier’ ‘worse o ff  self-employment activities. Along empirical 
lines, Tanzel and Ozdemir (2014) find that Egyptian females were less likely than males to move from 
formal employment to self-employment, however, concerning transition from unemployment to self­
employment, gender differences were insignificant. In the Peru labour market, being a male increased 
chances of self-employment entry (Chong et a/., 2008). Evidence from Turkey, however finds that the 
likelihood of self-employment entry was higher for women than men (Tansel and Kan, 2012).
Theoretical literature has underscored several arguments on the influence of age in the probability of 
entering self-employment: a positive influence of age and a negative relationship. Considering the first 
argument, older individuals are more likely to be self-employed compared to younger individuals 
because they would have on average, a larger amount of key resources that support their transition to 
self-employment, namely financial, social and human capital (Calvo and Wellisz, 1980; Praag and 
Ophem, 1995; Giandrea et a/., 2008). Secondly, older people may have a stronger desire for more 
flexible employment situations as their limited health status may preclude the possibility of a full-time 
job (Karoly and Zissimopoulos, 2004). A third line of reasoning is that self-employment is a job 
alternative for individuals who want to avoid mandatory retirement, postponing the age at which they 
leave the labour market (Giandrea et a/., 2008; Kerr and Armstrong-Stassen 2011; van Solinge, 2014). 
A significant part of older individuals may move to some form of employment between their main 
career and the final labour force withdrawal. Cahill et a/.,(2006) terms this “bridge employment.” Older 
workers may also be having more mature children who can help with their business, making them have 
a comparative advantage in self-employment. All these reasons make older workers more likely to enter 
self-employment compared to younger workers.
On the other hand, arguments that identify a negative influence of age on self-employment entry 
mention high-risk aversion levels of older people and lower physical and mental availability to cope 
with the demands of self-employment activities as reasons why older workers face a lesser probability 
of entering self-employment. Moreover, less time to recover from the initial investment made at entry 
into self-employment may reduce the incentive for older individuals to enter self-employment 
(Hintermaier and Steinberger, 2005). In addition, according to the human capital theory, since the
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earnings of salaried workers increase with age and experience, older people may have less incentive to 
enter self-employment as salaried employment ‘has more to offer.’ There is large literature that also 
documents particularly poor formal sector outcomes for young workers, thereby increasing their 
probability of self-employment entry as an alternative means of income before they get formal jobs 
(Nickell and Nunziata, 2000; Addison, 2001; Pages and Montenegro, 2007).
Evidence from Brazil, Mexico and Argentina suggests that the probability of entering self-employment 
from unemployment is less for young workers (aged 16-24) compared to middle-aged workers (24-40). 
Evidence by Tansel and Ozdemir (2014) for the Egyptian labour market further supports the positive 
influence of age on self-employment entry as they find that age group 45 to 64 group is significantly 
more likely than age group 15 to 24 to move from unemployment to self-employment.
The influence of education on self-employment is also far from conclusive from both a theoretical and 
empirical point of view. Lack of access to better education can be a constraint to entering self­
employment while better education can also enable workers in making the self-employment decision. 
In one strand of the theoretical sphere, better educated workers have a higher propensity to enter self­
employment as they are on average more able to identify self-employment opportunities and might have 
greater managerial abilities which are critical in self-employment success (Lucas Jr., 1978; Calvo and 
Wellisz, 1980). A different strand argues that individuals with better educational levels have better job 
opportunities in the formal sector therefore are less probable to enter into self-employment compared 
to their lesser-educated counterparts (Van Der Sluis et a/., 2008; Brown et a/., 2011). This suggests that 
although education expands an individual’s knowledge base and increases exposure to new 
opportunities, education also increases the opportunity cost of being self-employed (Tamvada, 2010). 
Returns to salaried employment also increase faster than returns to entrepreneurship as per capita 
income grows with the result that individuals have ‘more to lose’ by engaging in entrepreneurship 
(Lucas Jr., 1978). Moreover, the stigma associated with working informally may be higher for better 
educated workers, thereby reducing their propensity to move to this type of employment (Bernabe and 
Stampini, 2009).
The empirical results reflect the theoretical ambiguity. Perry et a/., (2010) find that better-educated 
workers in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina had a lower probability of moving into informal self­
employment from unemployment. Tansel and Kan (2012) find that being more educated reduced the 
probability of entering self-employment in the Turkish labour market. Tansel and Ozdemir (2014) find
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that better educated Egyptian workers were less likely than their more educated counterparts to move 
from unemployment into self-employment.
In terms of location, as rural areas are characterised by weaker wage employment opportunities than 
urban areas, we can hypothesise that the propensity to enter self-employment is greater in these areas 
than in urban ones since other employment options are scarce. Moreover, competition from larger and 
more established businesses is less harsh in rural areas; therefore, this may be a strong incentive to enter 
self-employment in rural areas, and increasing rural workers’ self-employment participation rates.
On the other hand, usually cities are provided with better and more modern infrastructure; cities have 
better supply of physical, financial and human capital, and connected services, and cities have a more 
modern industrial structure in the sense that their shares of growing industry are higher (Eliasson and 
Westlund, 2013). In addition, urban areas offer more business opportunities as well as better access to 
credit facilities. All these factors, which are vital to successfully operate informal enterprises, may 
increase the propensity for urban dwellers to enter self-employment compared to workers situated in 
rural locations. From an empirical perspective, Tansel and Ozdemir (2014) find that Egyptian workers 
who resided in urban areas were less likely to transition into self-employment from unemployment.
People’s ethnic and/or racial ancestry may expose them to a variety of cultural and psychological factors 
that affect their risk-taking and management skills. Moreover, ancestry may be correlated with the 
constraints they face as well (Hout and Rosen, 2000). Self-employment also has an important 
intergenerational component that can further be linked to race and and/or ancestry. Parents may pass on 
self-employment to their off-spring, but if  members of some group have historically been excluded from 
self-employment, or chosen to exclude themselves, then the intergenerational chain from self-employed 
father or mother, to self-employed offspring never starts. Several mechanisms may also transmit the 
propensity to be self-employed across ethnic/racial lines. For example, self-employed parents may 
endow their children with human capital (managerial skills, knowledge, values, and attitudes) that is 
necessary to running a business and performing well as an entrepreneur (Lentz and Laband, 1990). 
Moreover, financial capital and social networks necessary for entrepreneurship can also be transferred 
through intergenerational lines. Financial capital from parents may act as a safety net in case of adverse 
business conditions and can minimize start-up capital constraints. Parents may also provide role models 
and adopt child rearing practises that increase children’s disposition towards self-employment and 
facilitate entrance into it (Kerckhoff, 1976). All these factors may increase the likelihood of the specific 
ethnicity/race (which has been historically advantaged) and its offspring to become self-employed.
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Empirical literature on the effects of ancestry/race on transitions to self-employment in developing 
countries seems to be lacking and the current study may help to fill this gap.
Marital status influences labour market outcomes. In terms of self-employment, several arguments can 
be examined. Firstly, the wealth of the potential entrepreneur increases if an individual is married to a 
partner who is also working. This fact not only directly increases the probability of transition to self­
employment but also assures that if  financial difficulties arise in the business, that wealth will allow the 
activity to last longer (Simoes et a/., 2013: 7). Secondly, spouses are a critical source of emotional 
support which may become crucial given the strong demands of self-employment (Bosma et a/., 2004). 
The spouse may also support in the business, being a worker that most probably pursues the best interest 
of the business (Borjas, 1986). Moreover, the spouse may work as an unpaid worker, thereby reducing 
the projected costs of running the enterprise and thereby incentivising entry into it.
On the other hand, married people with children may be less willing to take the risks associated with 
entrepreneurship, reducing incidence of self-employment entry, as business failure is associated with a 
larger negative externality. From an empirical perspective, we still cannot draw solid conclusions. 
Tanzel and Kan (2012) find no relationship between marital status and transitions to informal self­
employment in the Turkish labour market. Tansel and Ozdemir (2014) also find no significant 
relationship between marital status and transitions to informal self-employment from all other labour 
states in the Egyptian labour market.
From the above discussion, theoretical literature on the determinants of transitions from unemployment 
into informal self-employment (except, ancestry and/or race) is mixed on whether one factor increases 
or decreases propensity of entering entrepreneurship. Moreover, to a certain degree, these factors are 
correlated with each other. For example, we may assume that being married increases the probability of 
being self-employed. At the same time, while marriage can be a factor, we can hypothesise that most 
married individuals are generally older; therefore, age becomes another influence. The influence of 
marital status may also differ across gender lines.
2.4.2 Factors influencing transitions into informal self-employment: The utility maximisation 
theory
It is unarguably correct that there are many factors at play, which influence movements into self­
employment in the informal sector. In addition to unobservable traits ( for example, managerial abilities
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and/or motivation, desire for independence and greater flexibility) that impact a workers decision to be 
self-employed, workers often make labour market state decisions based on utility maximisation. 
Focusing only on the observable worker characteristics and ignoring the impact of the ‘unobservables’ 
as well as the process of utility maximisation, would potentially cause a bias in estimating and making 
sense of transition results.
An individual’s decision to supply labour results from utility maximising behaviour. From this view, 
the informal sector labour market can be seen from three angles: (1) as a free-entry sector that 
prospective workers enter only as a last resort, (2) as a desirable sector that workers choose in preference 
to formal sector work and (3) the informal sector with its own internal dualism combining (1) and (2) 
(Fields, 2005). It is mainly from these three scenarios that workers decide to enter or not to enter the 
informal sector. Considering the first scenario where the informal sector is seen as a free-entry sector, 
in poor countries lacking systems of unemployment insurance and cash assistance allowances, the great 
majority of poor people cannot afford to be without income. So, to the extent that the poor can quickly 
find an opportunity to earn some cash in an informal job, they take it. Therefore, in this view, a worker 
chooses between earning some cash in the informal sector (self-employment) versus earning nothing 
(unemployment). Informal sector employment is seen to be worse than formal sector employment but 
superior to unemployment.
Scenario (2) reflects the view that appears in literature that postulates the informal sector as consisting 
of workers who are there voluntarily. In terms of utility-maximisation, workers will choose among jobs 
and sectors on the basis of a package of characteristics including wages, benefits and the work 
environment. These packages can be roughly comparable between informal self-employment and 
formal employment. There are many reasons why workers might want to be in the informal sector: some 
can earn more (or hope to earn more) in informal self-employment compared to in formal employment, 
they value the independence of self-employment, they would rather use the money that protections cost 
them for investing in their own small enterprises, they do not value protections such as health insurance 
which formal employment offers to them, in some cases because they already have these protections; 
and they do not trust the government to deliver on promises such as future pension benefits (Fields, 
2005: 23). For any or all of these reasons, there may be a sizeable numbers of workers who prefer to 
enter informal self-employment as to formal wage employment.
Lastly, scenario (3) depicts the dualism that has been seen to exist in the informal sector consisting of 
an ‘upper-tier’ and a ‘lower-tier.’ Utility maximising workers would choose to enter into the more
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productive ‘upper-tier’ where there are higher incomes. Therefore, where perceived informal self­
employment incomes are more than those for informal wage employment, workers decide to enter into 
self-employment, although barriers to entry may inhibit this transition.
The above assumptions relating to unobservable traits and the utility maximising behaviour of workers 
points out as a possible challenge to this study in the identification of factors affecting worker transitions 
between 2008 and 2012 as this study only focuses on observable characteristics. It is therefore a major 
limitation to the current study and a precaution in interpreting the findings.
2.5 South Africa’s stance on informal entrepreneurship
South Africa has made major reforms on its policy on small businesses since Apartheid. These reforms 
were aimed at promoting entrepreneurship amongst especially marginalised groups of the population 
through both financial and non-financial support mechanisms. The success or failure of policies on 
informal businesses can enable or hinder workers from transitioning from unemployment to informal 
self-employment. Moreover, policy failure hinders survival of those workers already in self­
employment, thereby increasing risk of backward movement into unemployment.
The 1995 White Paper on small, medium and microenterprises (SMMEs) was one of the first policy 
documents of the new government after democracy. One of its key objectives was supporting the 
advancement of women in all business sectors. Also Post-Apartheid, there have been two main small 
business support programs, spearheaded by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The Khula 
Enterprise Finance Limited was established to finance small businesses and the Ntsika Enterprise 
Promotion Strategy’s main goal was to dispense non-financial support. The target for Ntsika is 
survivalist micro and very small enterprises. Khula provides a range of credit guarantee mechanisms 
that are designed to reduce the risk on SMMEs’ loans, thereby encouraging commercial banks to 
provide finance to those operating in the SMME sector. A more detailed discussion on other 
organisations set up by the government to support small businesses is offered by Tassin (2014). 
However, the general consensus in South African literature is that there has been failure of government 
policy in starting up and growing small businesses, even with the setting up of the Ministry of Small 
Business Development in 2014.
South Africa’s small businesses policies have done little to create effective support agencies to help 
support business start-ups. In addition, many of the government’s support systems remain very low
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because of lack of coordinated strategies. In both the New Growth Path (NGP) and the National 
Development Plan (NDP), informal businesses are hardly mentioned. The NDP does not envisage any 
structural changes in informal employment. This ineffectiveness of policy can be a reason why informal 
employment in South Africa, more precisely self-employment, has been weak. In addition, as 
unemployed workers have not received enough training in setting up enterprises, this acts as a barrier 
to transition into self-employment and moves them to informal wage jobs where there are poor working 
conditions. Perhaps, the government could learn from other developing countries like India which have 
successfully implemented policies on small businesses.
2.6 Informal sector transitions in South Africa
Literature on informal sector transitions in South Africa is sparse. This section of the chapter reviews 
the studies done to date on these type of transitions. Banerjee et al., (2008) provide a quantitative 
analysis of transitions from unemployment to other employment states (and vice versa) as well as 
transitions between the informal and formal sectors. For relevancy and brevity, this thesis only 
documents their findings on the latter type of transitions. Their analysis is based on panel data 
comprising matched LFS waves between September 2001 and March 2004. After constructing 
transition matrices to examine the link between the informal and formal sectors, their results were as 
follows: only 12 percent of those who were initially working in the informal sector made a transition to 
the formal sector within the first six months of the study, 52 percent remained in the informal sector, 21 
percent became unemployed and 12 percent dropped out of the labour force.
Banerjee et al., (2008) find that it was easier to enter the formal sector from the informal sector as 12 
percent of informal sector employees made this transition. About 9 percent of workers entered the sector 
from non-searching unemployed and a similar proportion entered the sector from the searching 
unemployed state. Discouraged workers were twice as likely to find work in the informal sector as in 
the formal sector. For the searching unemployed, the likelihood of formal sector employment was the 
same as for the informal sector. The study also finds that the probability of youth staying in the informal 
sector was low (28 percent). About 8.5 percent of youth who were in the informal sector, transitioned 
into the formal sector. In terms of race, Africans were more likely to remain in the informal sector. 
While only 19 percent of Whites in the informal sector remained there after six months, over 50 percent 
of Africans and Coloureds and 43 percent of Indians remained in the sector. About 60 percent of Whites 
in the informal sector transitioned to the formal sector after six months; the corresponding figure for
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Coloureds and Indians was about 20 percent. The share of Africans who transitioned from the informal 
sector to the formal sector was below 10 percent.
An earlier study by Cichello et al., (2005) uses data from the Kwazulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study 
(KIDS). The study provides similar transition matrices, but covers a five-year interval (1993-1995) 
rather than the six months of Banerjee et al., (2008) above. For the study, informal sector employment 
and informal employment were used synonymously, therefore the author interprets the findings as such. 
The authors find a lower percentage of African workers making the transition from informal to formal 
sectors compared to the study by Banerjee et al., (2008) (17 percent versus 60 percent above for Whites). 
On the other hand, more African workers remained in informal employment (42 percent against 19 
percent above for Whites). A higher percentage of informal sector workers ended up being non­
employed (41 percent against 33 percent above). However, this study only focused on (1) prime-aged 
(25-54 years of age) and (2) African workers. The drawback of the first limitation is that it does not take 
into account the youth and older workers who are all important groups for such labour market analyses. 
The drawback of the second limitation is that it does not allow comparison by population groups of 
worker transitions.4 Moreover, the survey sample was designed to be representative at the provincial 
level and not at the national level; therefore, these interpretations had better explanations for 
employment dynamics at the provincial level and not necessarily at the national level (IFPRI et al., 
2001: 6).
A study by Altman (2008) matched individuals from the LFS between February 2002 and March 2004 
to explore the extent to which individuals move between labour market states and between different 
segments of the economy. The author finds that only 1.3 percent of individuals who were in informal 
employment at the beginning of the period under consideration, remained in this segment of the 
economy. The study finds that a large number of workers moved between the informal economy and 
being unemployed or economically inactive. A significant proportion of workers (18.3 percent) had 
moved between formal and informal employment. After reducing the period under consideration to six 
months (September 2003 to March 2004), they find that 44.5 percent of workers who were in the 
informal economy at the beginning of the period, were still in informal employment. On the other hand, 
only 3.4 percent of workers who reported to be in formal employment in September 2003 were now in 
informal employment.
4The authors support their exclusion of the two age cohorts by mentioning that they sought to define a set of dynamic labour force participants, excluding 
those in the process of entering or exiting the labour force for demographic reasons (avoiding swelling of unemployment rates by workers under the age of 
25) (Cichello et al., (2005). Limiting the sample to only one population group also restricts the analysis and neglects movements by other population groups 
that may also be interesting. All these reasons have a bearing on analysing informal-formal employment transitions.
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To date, the above studies are the only studies on informal sector transitions in South Africa to the 
author’s knowledge. The studies further add to evidence of significant churning between labour market 
states and employment categories in South Africa. A common finding on informal sector transitions is 
the higher share of workers that move from the informal sector to the formal sector, while a smaller 
share of workers make the opposite movement. The studies also show that the informal sector state is 
more of a temporary employment state for a large group of workers since a significant share of them 
end up out of employment or in the formal sector. It will be interesting to see whether the analysis (over 
a longer period) in the later chapters of this thesis will show similar results.
In addition to the already mentioned drawbacks, the studies above lack in the following areas: (1) they 
do not separate the workers in each sector into different categories; for example, the informal sector 
and/or informal employment further contain distinct sub-groups (employers and employees); and (2) 
they do not pay much attention to the different demographic characteristics of workers who remain in 
one state or move to another -  some characteristics of workers may be causing the differences in their 
probabilities to either remain in the same state or to move to another state. Such an examination of the 
profile of workers is necessary in order to see which workers are moving ahead or are lagging in making 
a transition to another state. Therefore, policies, which target specific groups of workers, can then be 
implemented rather than general labour market policies, which are not intent. Such a gap is being filled 
by this thesis with a specific focus on informal employment transitions.
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CHAPTER 3:
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The last section of the preceding chapter reviewed some studies done on informal sector transitions in 
South Africa. This thesis follows from these studies and utilises some of the methods used by the authors 
to examine worker transitions between two periods. This chapter is divided into two sections. Section
3.1 describes the data used for the study. The section also justifies the sample used for the study as well 
as how workers are classified into different segments of South Africa’s working-age population. Section
3.2 discusses the two methods employed by this study to examine worker transitions into informal 
employment.
3.1 Data and Definition of Variables
There are several household surveys in South Africa including the Project for Statistics on Living 
Standards and Development (PSLSD), the October Household Survey (OHS), the General Household 
Survey (GHS), the Income and Expenditure Survey (IES), the Labour Force Survey (LFS), the Quarterly 
Labour Force Survey (QLFS) and the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS). The last two surveys 
have, however been the most widely used in analysing labour market transitions because they are the 
only ones which follow the same group of people or individuals over time (see studies by Leung et al., 
2009; Verick, 2010; Cichello et al., 2012 and Essers, 2013).
The QLFS is a household-based sample survey conducted by Statistics South Africa, which collects 
data, every quarter, on the labour market activities of individuals who are at least 15 years old and reside 
in the country. The QLFS is the principal vehicle for disseminating labour market information on a 
quarterly basis (Statistics SA, 2008: v). Its sample size is roughly 30 000 dwellings, separated into 7 500 
dwellings per rotation group (Statistics SA, 2008: xiv). However, the sampling unit is the dwelling 
rather than the household. Therefore, if  one household moves out of a particular dwelling and another 
moves in, it is the new household that will be enumerated in the next quarter (Statistics SA, 2008: xiv). 
Using the QLFS as a longitudinal dataset for individuals is therefore problematic, as dwelling identifiers 
are generally maintained across quarters but individual identifiers are not necessarily so.
The National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) is South Africa’s first nationally representative 
household panel survey. It tracks a sample of about 28,000 individuals in 7,300 households across the
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country over time (NIDS, 2015). Unlike the QLFS, a key feature of the survey is its ability to follow 
people as they move out of their original households. NIDS combines household-level, as well as 
individual-level interviews. The former are administered to the oldest woman in the household, while 
the latter are addressed at individual household members. The questionnaires contain several sections, 
among others, labour market participation, household income, demographics and education. There are 
separate questionnaires for adults (aged 15 or older) and children (directed to the mother or caregiver). 
A full description of the NIDS data and access to questionnaires used during the interviews is available.5
The NIDS data set contains richer information compared to other household surveys in South Africa, 
for example, labour market participation and demographic information of an individual. It is therefore, 
an essential instrument in explaining labour market transitions. Such movements can then be linked to 
several other individual and household-level characteristics. The longitudinal character of NIDS makes 
the current labour analysis a natural complement to studies done on South Africa’s labour market using 
matched cross-sections of the LFS or QLFS (Banerjee et al., 2008; Leung et al., 2009; Verick, 2010; 
Cichello et al., 2012). Wave 1, 2, 3 and 4 took place in 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014/15 respectively. This 
study makes use of a merged dataset containing the most recent versions 5.3 and 1.3 of waves 1 and 3, 
respectively. Wave 3 for NIDS was the most preferred to use because of the data irregularities which 
were associated with the preceding wave which are comprehensively discussed by Cichello et al., (2012: 
67-68).
For the specific aim and methodology of this study, the panel sample extracted covers the labour force 
defined by those between the ages 15 to 64 years who responded to labour market status questions in 
both 2008 and 2012. That corresponds to 10 682 individuals. The author further identifies six labour 
market states for the workers, namely: unemployed, not economically active (NEA), formal wage 
employed, and formal self-employed, informal wage employed and informal self-employed. The last 
two states fall under the umbrella term ‘informal employment.’ By disaggregating the labour force into 
multiple subcategories, we are able to scrutinize the different patterns of labour mobility defined as 
worker transitions between distinct labour market states. Unemployment is based on the broad 
definition, which includes individuals who are not working, but actively searching for a job, as well as 
discouraged workers (those who would have liked to work but are not actively seeking for a job).6 The
5http://www.nids.uct.ac.za/.
6 Statistics SA uses the strict unemployment definition in its QLFS publications as recommended by ILO (1982). However, a study by Posel et al., (2013) 
using NIDS wave 1 and wave 2 finds substantive evidence that the non-searching unemployed form a legitimate and integral part of the labour force and 
should be included in unemployment measures. An earlier study by Kingdon and Knight (2004) also asserts that the broad unemployment rate is the best
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NEA category of workers entails people who are not employed and do not want to find employment for 
example students, homemakers and the retired. Formal wage employment entails workers who are 
entitled to legal and social benefits. Formal self-employment is made up of workers whose enterprises 
are registered for VAT and/or income tax.
There is growing consensus in both international and local literature on how informal employment 
should be defined and/or measured due to the increasing attention that this concept has received over 
the last couple of years. Informal enterprises have been distinguished in terms of their size (that is, 
number of employees) and in some approaches, by their registration status. Informal jobs have been 
referred to as those that are not subject to labour legislation, income taxation, social protection or 
entitlements to certain employment benefits such as sick leave (ILO, 2013). Due to the existence of 
some jobs in the formal sector which are characterised by conditions that are typical of ‘informal work,’ 
employment-based definitions have been developed which combine the concept of informal enterprises 
and informal jobs together to measure informal employment (Hussmans, 2004) thereby making the 
measures of ‘informality’ more representative of the total informal workers in the economy. Under the 
new definitions recommended by the 17th ICLS, employees are those individuals holding informal jobs, 
regardless of sector in which the enterprise is operating in, or as paid domestic workers (ILO, 2013). 
Informal employment therefore comprises the total number of jobs, whether carried out in formal sector 
enterprises, informal sector enterprises, or households, during a given reference period (Hussmans, 
2004: 26).
The table below shows the recommendations on how employment in the informal sector and informal 
employment should be measured.
Table 1: Classification of informal employment and informal sector employment
Informal Jobs Formal Jobs
Informal Sector Enterprises A B
Other Units of Production C D
ILO (2013)
measure in South Africa. In addition, since as we will see later on that there are some discouraged individuals who transitioned to employment, it will be 
conceptually sensible to add these into the unemployed group.
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A + C = Persons in Informal Employment; A + B = Persons Employed in the Informal Sector; C = 
Informal Employment outside the Informal Sector; B = Formal Employment in the Informal Sector.
In South African literature, several authors suggest different criteria to measure informal employment 
(for example, Devey et al., 2006; Heinz and Posel, 2008; Yu, 2012). Until 2007, Statistics SA adopted 
the enterprise approach to measure informal employment as only those working in the informal sector 
(Statistics SA, 2006). With the introduction of the QLFS in 2008, two methods have now been used to 
define informal employment. For the first method, the informal sector is made up of (1) employees 
defined as informal if  income tax (PAYE/SITE) was not deducted from their salary/wage and the 
number of employees at the place of work is fewer than five. This method has been used internationally 
as proxy for wage employment in the informal sector (ILO, 2012). Next, (2) employers, own-account 
workers and those who were unpaid in household business are classified as informal self-employed if 
their businesses are not registered for either income tax or VAT (Yu, 2012: 10; Budlender, 2012: 2).
For the second method, informal employment includes employment in informal sector enterprises and 
those workers who display informal characteristics but working in the formal sector. People who are 
unpaid in household businesses are also classified as informal, while those employees in the formal 
sector who are not entitled to medical aid or pension funds or do not have a written contract with the 
employer, are re-coded as informal (Yu, 2010: 8). This follows the guidelines from the 17th ICLS. 
However, Yu (2010) and Budlender (2011) argue that Statistics SA has not been using this second 
method in its QLFS reports.7 Heinz and Posel (2008: 32) also suggest that employees be defined as 
informal if  they do not have a written employment contract and are not entitled to paid leave and pension 
contributions. Yu (2008: 13) shows a comprehensive table of the different indicators used to measure 
informal sector and informal employment in South African literature.
7 Budlender (2011) mentions that Statistics South Africa is uncomfortable with its own definition of informal employment and will thus not be reporting 
on this variable until a new definition has been decided.
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Table 2: Indicators used to define informal sector and informal employment in each approach, QLFS
Stats SA method 
A
Stats SA method 
B
Revised H einz & 
Posel
Revised Gasparini and 
Tornarolli
Revised Henley et 
al.
M ini Devey et 
al.
Self-employed
Company/ CC registration
VAT registration S S S
Income tax registration S S S
Educational attainment S
O ccupation S
# o f indicators used 2 2 2 1 1 N/A
Employees
Pension fund S S S
Paid leave S S
UIF S
M edical aid S S
W ritten contract S S S
Job permanence S
Firm  size S S S S S
Income tax generation S S
# o f indicators used 2 5 3 1 1 7
Source: Yu (2008: 13)
The table shows that there is more consensus on the indicators used to measure informal self­
employment however, it lacks on the indicators used to measure informal employees. The rates of 
informality can therefore be bigger or smaller from study to study depending on the definitions used to 
measure the concept and depending on which concept is being measured- informal sector or informal 
employment.
Table 3 below shows the approach this study uses to define and classify the six segments of the working- 
age population in South Africa mentioned above. The definitions for the various segments, including 
informal employment, are adopted to be as consistent as possible to the existing theoretical and 
empirical literature (for example, Heinz and Posel, 2008; Wills, 2010; Budlender 2011).
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Table 3: Definitions for labour market status
i. Unemployed (Broad) includes individuals who are not working, but 
actively searching for a job, as well as 
discouraged workers (those who would have 
liked to work but are not actively seeking for a 
job)
ii. Not Economically Active entails people who are not employed and do not 
want to find employment
iii. Informal Employment total number of informal jobs, whether 
carried out in formal sector enterprises, informal 
sector enterprises, or households, during a given 
reference period
iv. Informal self-employed Persons engaged in self-employment activities 
whose businesses are NOT registered for VAT 
and/or Income tax
v. Informal employees (including domestic 
workers and casual workers)
Employees holding informal jobs, that is, they 
are NOT entitled to social (UIF, pension, 
medical aid) and legal (written contract) benefits
vi. Formal self-employed Persons engaged in self-employment activities 
whose businesses are registered for VAT and/or 
income tax
vii. Formal wage employees Employees entitled to social (UIF, pension, 
medical aid) and legal (written contract) benefits
As mentioned above, the QLFS has been the most widely used dataset in South African labour market 
analyses. The tables below show how the QLFS compares with the NIDS in capturing informal 
employment. The same definitions for informal employees and the informal self-employed as shown in 
table 3 above are used to measure informal employment across the two surveys. The NIDS wave 1 
(2008) and Q2 2008 of the Statistics SA are used to compare informal employment. Q2 of the QLFS is 
used to compare with NIDS wave 1 because from an analysis of the dataset, most interviews of the latter 
were done in the second quarter of the year. The sample only includes individuals who are working-age 
(15-64). Table 4 shows total informal employment in frequencies and table 5 shows it in percentages. 
Workers are separated into informal employees, unpaid workers, domestic workers and self-employed
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workers. Such breakdowns were recommended by ILO and seen as useful for definitional, analysis and 
policy purposes (Hussmans, 2004: 5-6). The NIDS has a special category for casual workers which is 
not included in the QLFS. Most casual workers are in precarious employment situations, that is, they 
are not entitled to social and legal protection and do not engage in ‘decent work.’8 Estimates for the 
casual workers category for NIDS are also shown in the tables. For the QLFS, self-employed workers 
are separated as employers and own-account workers. Employers are those who fulfil the conditions of 
informal self-employment and work with the help of unpaid family members. Own-account workers are 
those who fulfil the conditions of informal self-employment and work on their own. NIDS does not 
contain a question which asks if the self-employed workers hire people or not, therefore such a 
disaggregation is not done for the NIDS estimates. Unpaid workers are contributing family workers, 
irrespective of whether they work in formal or informal sector enterprises. Unpaid work is separated 
into those inside the informal sector and those outside the sector for the QLFS estimates. The NIDS 
does not allow for such a disaggregation as it does not explicitly separate workers into the formal and 
informal sectors. A further disaggregation of informal employment but excluding agricultural activities 
is also done only for analysis purposes.9
8 The QLFS has less emphasis on marginal work, therefore may not be picking up as much informal work as the LFS (Budlender, 2011: 2).
9 Questions 4.6, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.11 of the QLFS 2008 Q2 questionnaire are used to determine these job-based definitions of informal employees. Questions 
E12.5, E12.6, E12.7 and E13.1 of the NIDS 2008 questionnaire are used to determine the same. Question E28 and E37 of the NIDS questionnaire relate to 
self-employment and registration of workers.
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Table 4: Frequency of informal employment by alternative data sources, QLFS 2008 (Q2) and NIDS 
2008
In form al self-em ploym ent
In form al w age  
em ploym ent
U npaid
D om estic
W ork ers
C asual
W ork ers
T otal
(S e lf-em ployed  +  
w age em p loyees +  
u n p a id  +  dom estic  
w ork ers +  casual 
w orkers)
Own-account Employers
Inside the 
informal 
sector
Outside the 
informal 
sector
T otal
NIDS 1 334 351 (77 858)
1 170 209 
(79 720)
285 404 
(47 050)
728 321 
(61 146)
1 371 213 
(81 110) 4 889 498
Stats SA- 
QLFS
1 183 790 
(29 895)
295 037 
(14 844)
1 781 929 
(39 112)
85 426 
(7 626)
40 401 
(5 457)
989 243 
(26 468) 4 375 826
N on -agricu ltural
NIDS 1 218 520 (73 569)
1 141 654 
(79 327)
212 109 
(38 348)
712 090 
(60 885)
1 282 877 
(78 798) 4 567 250
Stats SA- 
QLFS
1 169 375 
(29 774)
286 205 
(14 674)
1 511 486 
(36 256)
80 927 
(7 493)
35 969 
(5 261)
989 243 
(26 468) 4 073 205
Source: Own calculations from Statistics South Africa’s 2008 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (Q2) and the National Income Dynamic Study (NIDS- 2008). 
Notes: All frequencies and proportions are weighted. Standard errors are in brackets.
Sample is restricted to adults aged 15-64 in 2008 and gave valid responses.
Total informal employment included all types of work: i.e. unpaid work, casual work, domestic work and agricultural work.
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Table 5: Percentage of informal employment by alternative data sources QLFS 2008 (Q2) and NIDS
2008
In form al se lf-em ploym ent
In form al
w age
em ploym ent
U n p aid
D om estic
W ork ers
C asual
W ork ers
T otal
(Se lf-em ployed  
+  w age  
em p loyees +  
u n p a id  +  
dom estic  
w ork ers +  
casual 
w orkers)
Inside the Outside theOwn- Employers informal informalaccount sector sector
T otal
11.12 9.75 2.38 6.07 11.43NIDS 40.75(0.62) (0.63) (0.39) (0.50) (0.65)
Stats SA- 8.12 2.02 12.22 0.59 0.28 6.78 30.01QLFS (0.20) (0.10) (0.25) (0.05) (0.04) (0.18)
N on -agricu ltural
10.15 9.51 1.77 5.93 10.69NIDS 38.05(0.59) (0.63) (0.32) (0.49) (0.63)
Stats SA- 8.02 1.96 10.36 0.55 0.25 6.78 27.92QLFS (0.20) (0.10) (0.24) (0.05) (0.04) (0.18)
Source: Own calculations from Statistics South Africa’s 2008 Quarterly Labour Force Survey (Q2) and the National Income Dynamic Study (NIDS-
2008).
Notes: All frequencies and proportions are weighted. Standard errors are in brackets.
Sample is restricted to adults aged 15-64 in 2008 and gave valid responses.
Total informal employment included all types of work: i.e. unpaid work, casual work, domestic work and agricultural work.
The tables above show that estimates for the QLFS and the NIDS do not vary substantially when 
measuring the different categories of informal employment. However, the special category of casual 
workers in the NIDS allows to capture more informal employment in South Africa, therefore the survey 
is more suitable in examining the trends in the country’s informal labour market since studies done 
using the QLFS may have understated a large group of informal workers.
This study has a few data-related limitations that are important to highlight. Firstly, the findings are 
limited to the balanced sample, which only includes individuals who responded on employment statuses 
in both 2008 and 2012. Other individuals who were interviewed in 2008 did not have successful 
interviews in 2012 for reasons such as refusal to be interviewed, unavailability, could not be relocated 
or tracked, had moved out of South Africa or were deceased. Baigrie and Eyal (2013) show that 
‘attritors’ are more likely to be employed. The loss of these individuals leads to a smaller sample size, 
thereby the findings do not completely reflect labour dynamics for South Africa’s working-age
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population. In addition to this, when quite narrow transition groups are focused on (such as Indians/ 
Asians or post-school, no matric educated workers) as will be shown later, the sample gets smaller while 
standard errors get bigger making statistical inferences less robust. Although the panel weight supplied 
by NIDS that is meant to correct for this attrition bias will be used for the forthcoming empirical 
analysis, estimates for this small sample of individuals may not be very accurate.
Secondly, the NIDS data does not provide information on employment in the informal sector, as it does 
not entail questions for employees on (1) the number of workers at the enterprise and (2) the registration 
status of the enterprise. Registration status questions are only available for the self-employed workers. 
In light of this data limitation, the study cannot distinguish between employees inside the informal sector 
and those outside the sector.
3.2 Empirical Analysis Methods
To address the research questions, this study uses a two-pronged approach, combining the transitional 
matrix analysis and an econometric estimation of labour mobility from unemployment to the various 
labour market statuses, with emphasis on movements into informal employment.
3.2.1 Transition analysis
Individual labour market movements between different labour market states using panel data such as 
NIDS, have become traceable through the construction of transition matrices which detail for each 
possible initial status in period one, what percentage of individuals finds itself again in the same status 
(or in other statuses) by period two. Alongside cross-sectional pictures of South Africa’s labour market 
which will be given in the following chapter, the use of longitudinal panel data can help to assess if 
such developments in South Africa reflected (1) more people remaining in the same labour market state 
over time, (2) an increase in the number of people transitioning from one state to another, or, (3) a 
decrease in the transitions from one state to the other. The analysis of transitions in and out of labour 
market statuses thus offers significant advantages over a cross-sectional analysis, allowing us to observe 
the directions of flows and levels of status mobility behind any particular change in the proportions of 
workers in each state. Moreover, the methodology allows quantitatively assessing the role played by 
other demographic variables in terms of labour market flows over time.
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For a transition matrix, each cell denotes the propensity of moving between an initial labour market 
state i to a final labour market state j . Each cell of the transition matrix is a simple probability where:
pij= nij/ni (1)
Where pijn is the proportion of individuals who moved from some initial state i into a final state j for 
i=1,..., K and j=1,..., K. The term nij is the number of people who were in state i and moved to state j 
between periods t and t+1; and ni is the number of people who were in state i in period t. The transition 
matrix is denoted by:
Q = ...
p11... p1K 
pK1... pkk
For this analysis, this matrix can be used in many ways. First, we can examine the share of people who 
transition into employment, that is, from any out of employment state i (unemployed or not 
economically active) into employment, that is, the four employment states, namely formal wage 
employment, formal self-employment, informal wage employment and informal self-employment at j . 
Conversely, we can examine those who made the inverse transition. Second, we can also examine the 
share of people who transition between employment states, for example transitions from initial state 
i=informal wage employment into state j= formal wage employment. Since the study uses discrete panel 
data, rather than continuous time data, equation (1) can be interpreted as the transition probability with 
the assumption that transitions occur at random points in time, then a random draw of a transition in one 
point in time has the same probability (within a confidence interval) of a draw at any other point in time. 
Finally, the propensity to remain/move out of a certain labour market state can be calculated as the 
number who remain/leave the state as a share of the total number who move in or out of the state, for 
example the propensity to move out of an employment category will be:
rij = nij/(nij + nji) (2)
Transition matrices are important in identifying worker flows between different labour market states as 
well as identifying the characteristics of those workers who make a transition or who remain in the same 
state, however a multivariate analysis is important in examining the relationship and the effect that the 
characteristics have on movement to another state or on staying in the same state. The next section will 
describe the econometric estimation method that will be used in this study.
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3.2.2 Econometric estimation
While the estimated transition matrices for South Africans between being unemployed in 2008 and the 
various employment statuses, including informal employment in 2012 indicate what percentages of the 
labour force moved into informal employment between the two years, the transitions are not explicitly 
linked to various labour market characteristics. To augment the transition matrix analysis, an 
econometric estimation of the determinants of transitions is done. This has the advantage of allowing 
for statistical inferences on the estimated transitions, their structure and determinants. There are several 
possible estimation methods to econometrically-evaluate the impact of specific individual labour market 
characteristics and attributes on employment status transitions, including the linear probability model 
(LPM), difference in differences, the binary logit/probit or the multinomial models. Following Chong 
et al., (2008), Leung et al., (2009) and Essers (2013), a simplified and suitable approach for the current 
study is the maximum likelihood binary probit model with the following specification form:
Pr (Y = 1 | Xt-1) = O (Xt-1P), (3)
Where Pr denotes probability of an individual observed in 2012 being in some given employment status. 
Variable Y is the binary outcome of the transition under study; taking a value of 1, if  for example, an 
unemployed individual in 2008, is in informal employment in 2012 or 0 if he/she is outside of informal 
employment. X are the various characteristics of individuals, which determine their probabilities of 
moving between the different employment statuses. These factors include gender, age, education, race, 
marital status, provincial location and whether a person lived in urban or rural areas in 2008. The 
function O is the standard normal cumulative density function for the probit distribution in our case. 
Qualitatively, the probit is similar to the logit model (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009: 452). P defines the 
marginal effects of individuals’ labour market characteristics on their transition probabilities into the 
various employment statuses.
O f specific importance to the study, the above estimation allows us to econometrically estimate the 
probability of individuals who were unemployed or economically inactive in 2008 being in the various 
informal employment categories in 2012. The specification allows the unemployed individual to either 
remain unemployed or to be in other employment categories such as being in formal employment. The 
probit model is estimated for all the possible 2012 employment statuses of persons who were 
unemployed or economically inactive in 2008. Other studies of transitions use models of
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duration/survival analysis or hazard functions, for example Devicienti (2002)10, Stevens (2011) 11and 
Ismail (2015).12 Given that this study is interested in estimating the effects of various labour market 
covariates on employment status in 2012 rather than the unemployment persistence or exit from 
unemployment, for example, the probit model is a simpler way of addressing the study’s research 
question.
The probit models are estimated for the restricted ages of those falling between 15 to 64 years of age. 
First, separate transition probabilities are estimated for individuals who were unemployed in 2008 and 
are: in informal wage employment in 2012; or in informal self-employment in 2012; or in informal 
employment in 2012; or remain unemployed in 2012; or are now economically inactive in 2012. 
Informal employment probabilities are estimated both for aggregate informal employment and for the 
disaggregated forms of informal employment, that is, probabilities of being in informal wage 
employment and informal self-employment. Second, separate transition probabilities are estimated for 
individuals who were economically inactive in 2008 being in the same employment categories as in the 
first estimated model specifications, to account for the possibility of the economically inactive 
individuals joining informal employment as well. This allows the dissection of the probabilities of 
transition from both being unemployed or being economically inactive in 2008 to the different forms of 
employment states in 2012.
The aim of the probit analysis is to estimate the relationship between individual characteristics and 
transitions into informal employment between 2008 and 2012. This is achieved by using individuals’ 
2008 employment status and characteristics as the baseline and their employment status in 2012 as the 
endline outcome. Given that the outcome variable is binary taking values of 1 or 0 observed cross- 
sectionally in 2012, the probit models are estimated without fixed effects, which could have been 
appropriate if  Y was observed over a number of panels. The reported marginal effects of the various 
determinants of the probability of y determined at the averages of the covariates depict how the given 
explanatory variables influence the probability of leaving the initial state in 2008 for another 
employment destination state in 2012. All marginal effects on dummy variables are benchmarked to the 
base dummy variable categories. To obtain the effects of interactive variables such as the effects of 
females who are married on employment outcome status in 2012, the variable gender is interacted with 
marital status as suggested by Tansel and Kan (2012) and Tansel and Ozdemir (2014).
10 Devicienti (2002) estimates poverty transitions for Britain using the proportional hazard model of Prentice and Gloeckler, in which the hazard for 
transitions occurring in discrete intervals are derived from the underlying continuous time hazard.
11Stevens (2011) also used a hazard function in estimating poverty transitions for the United States.
12Ismail (2015) uses a survival analysis framework to analyse South African youth transitions in and out of unemployment.
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CHAPTER 4:
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
This chapter entails the first step of our two-pronged approach to answer the research question. Section
4.1 first offers a cross-sectional overview of South Africa’s working-age population in 2008 and 2012 
in terms of the six classifications given in chapter 3. Section 4.2 conducts a transitional analysis for the 
sample population across the two years of study, firstly for the total sample, then disaggregated 
according to worker characteristics which include gender, age groups, education level, race, marital 
status and location. This will preliminary assist in identifying labour flows between unemployment and 
informal employment as well as link them with worker characteristics before a multivariate analysis is 
done.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Following the definitions in table 3, the weighted frequencies and shares of each labour market category 
for 2008 and 2012 using the NIDS are given in table 6. The proportions for the labour market states are 
quite similar across the two years. As table 6 illustrates, the not economically active individuals make 
up the largest share of the total sample, reaching almost 40 percent for 2008. Unemployed individuals 
formed the second largest category of the sample at almost 20 percent. For the sample in employment, 
formal wage employment and informal wage employment stood at almost similar shares at about 14 
percent of the total sample. The remaining sample is comprised of formal self-employment and informal 
self-employment at approximately 2 percent and 6 percent respectively.
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Table 6: Distribution of Labour Market States in the Total Sample: 2008 and 2012
2008 2012
% %
Unemployment 23.98 25.02
(0.61) (0.64)
Not economically active 39.58 41.75
(0.68) (0.75)
Formal wage employment 14.12 14.01
(0.58) (0.63)
Formal self-employment 1.86 1.60
(0.25) (0.23)
Informal wage employment 14.36 12.39
(0.53) (0.51)
Informal self-employment 6.10 5.22
(0.35) (0.34)
Total 100 100
Source: Own calculations from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS- 2008 and 2012).
Notes: All proportions are weighted.
Standard errors are in brackets.
Sample restricted to adults aged 15-64 in 2008.
Informal wage employment includes unpaid work, domestic work, casual work and agricultural work.
Table 7 breaks down the sample into males and females and recalculates the labour market distribution 
accordingly. The proportion of the not economically active rises to 44 percent for females and reduces 
to about 34 percent for males for the 2008 proportions. As regards to informality, the figures reveal that 
more than three fifths of those women who are employed are in informal employment while men exhibit 
a more or less equal distribution across informal and formal employment. This is likely a reflection of 
the proportion of the female workforce which are domestic workers.
In order to provide a general picture of South Africa’s labour market and of its informality, the sample 
is decomposed by a number of key individual factors that influence transitions from unemployment into 
informal self- employment. Table 8 shows the sample distribution by 2008 variables namely age, 
highest level of education attained, race, marital status and location.
As shown from the table, unemployment seems to reduce with age. A large group of the middle-aged 
are in formal employment. The young and the elderly are seen to be more informal than formal. The
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middle-aged group has relatively the largest proportion of the sample in informal self-employment at 
about 10 percent. In terms of education, unemployment seems to exhibit a descending pattern as level 
of education increases; however, it slightly increases for workers with higher education. Formal 
employment appears to be positively correlated with level of education, while individuals with lesser 
education levels tend to be more informal than formal. Informal self-employment is highest among 
those workers with only a primary education at about 8 percent. Africans exhibit the highest rates of 
unemployment while White workers show the lowest levels of unemployment. A large group of White 
workers are in formal employment while most Africans show more informality than formality. O f the 
total sample of workers, African workers have a slightly larger proportion of workers in informal self­
employment relative to Whites.
In terms of marital status, workers who are not married or not cohabiting show higher levels of 
unemployment as compared with those who are married or cohabiting. Married and cohabiting workers 
exhibit high rates of formal employment while those who are not married or not cohabiting seem to be 
more informal than formal. Married and cohabiting workers show higher rates of informal self­
employment as compared to those who are not. The location variable shows that workers residing in 
urban areas have a slightly higher rate of unemployment as compared to those residing in rural areas. 
Workers residing in urban areas exhibit high rates of formal employment while those residing in rural 
areas show higher levels of informality. In terms of informal self-employment, it is more prevalent in 
workers residing in urban areas.
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Table 7: Distribution of the Labour Market States by Gender: 2008 and 2012
2008 2008
Male
%
Female
%
Unemployment 19.25 27.57
(0.89) (0.82)
Not economically active 33.63 44.07
(0.99) (0.91)
Formal wage employment 21.35 8.66
(1.05) (0.60)
Formal self-employment 2.71 1.21
(0.48) (0.25)
Informal wage employment 16.52 12.74
(0.88) (0.66)
Informal self-employment 6.55 5.76
(0.59) (0.42)
Total 100 100
Source: Own calculations from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS- 2008 and 2012).
Notes: All proportions are weighted.
Standard errors are in brackets.
Sample restricted to adults aged 15- 64 in 2008.
Informal wage employment includes unpaid work, domestic work, casual work and agricultural work.
53
2012 2012
Male
%
Female
%
24.87 25.14
(1.01) (0.83)
33.29 48.22
(1.12) (0.98)
20.91 8.73
(1.14) (0.65)
2.34 1.04
(0.44) (0.23)
12.35 12.42
(0.79) (0.67)
6.23 4.45
(0.58) (0.42)
100 100
Table 8: Sample distribution by other demographic characteristics, 2008
U NEA FW E FSE IW E ISE
% % % % % %
Age
15-34 28.10 44.58 9.52 0.88 12.93 3.99
(0.84) (0.92) (0.67) (0.21) (0.70) (0.38)
35-44 24.65 17.55 25.27 2.60 19.67 10.27
(1.38) (1.09) (1.60) (0.65) (1.40) (1.06)
45-64 13.12 45.36 16.37 3.69 13.55 7.91
(0.97) (1.47) (1.24) (0.79) (0.95) (0.76)
Education
No education 15.57 54.67 3.95 0.19 20.15 5.47
(1.70) (2.31) (1.19) (0.19) (1.93) (0.87)
Prim ary education 20.85 45.06 7.05 0.40 18.78 7.86
(1.15) (1.38) (0.83) (0.15) (1.20) (0.91)
Secondary education 27.12 41.39 11.54 1.23 13.24 5.47
(0.81) (0.88) (0.67) (0.25) (0.67) (0.41)
Post school, no matric 34.28 8.25 30.30 0.64 21.81 4.72
(5.61) (2.49) (5.19) (0.40) (6.93) (1.90)
H igher education 14.95 13.45 47.21 9.80 7.32 7.27
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(1.89) (2.04) (2.88) (1.87) (1.48) (1.42)
Race
African 25.67 41.44 11.49 0.82 14.17 6.41
(0.65) (0.72) (0.56) (0.14) (0.57) (0.38)
Coloured 23.33 33.36 18.83 1.08 20.08 3.31
(2.30) (2.16) (2.17) (0.55) (1.83) (0.94)
Asian 13.17 36.71 19.85 10.84 14.58 4.84
(3.99) (5.62) (4.31) (4.68) (4.93) (3.28)
W hite 12.42 29.17 31.81 9.39 11.20 6.02
(2.38) (2.99) (3.12) (2.01) (2.14) (1.32)
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U NEA FW E FSE IW E ISE
% % % % % %
Marital status
M arried /  Living 22.13 28.63 22.07 3.35 15.35 8.48
together (1.00) (1.09) (1.12) (0.55) (0.95) (0.69)
N ot m arried /  N ot 25.18 46.44 9.10 0.92 13.73 4.62
living together (0.76) (0.85) (0.61) (0.23) (0.64) (0.37)
Location
U rban 24.27 31.82 19.28 2.54 15.29 6.59
(0.87) (0.91) (0.86) (0.41) (0.74) (0.51)
N on-urban 23.23 51.39 6.26 0.81 12.96 5.35
(0.77) (0.95) (0.58) (0.16) (0.75) (0.40)
Mean age (years) 31.3 30.7 40 43.2 36.4 39
Mean education 
(years)
11.1 10.8 13.8 16.2 11.3 11.3
Source: Own calculations from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS- 2008 and 2012).
Notes: All proportions are weighted.
Standard errors are in brackets.
Sample restricted to adults aged 15 - 64 in 2008.
Informal wage employment includes unpaid work, domestic work, casual work and agricultural work.
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To sum up, informal employment appears to be mostly associated with individuals who are young or 
elderly, lesser educated, Africans, not married or not cohabiting and resident in rural/tribal areas. 
Particularly, its self-employment segment is made up of more middle-aged workers, those with a 
primary education, Africans, married or cohabiting workers and urban residents. The summary statistics 
set up the preliminary work for the analysis of transitions into informal employment in South Africa. 
The sample, as weighted by nationally representative survey weights, characterises roughly the 2008 
composition of the South African labour market along all dimensions being considered. In order to 
further delve into its dynamics, the parts below provide a transition analysis.
4.2 Transition matrix analysis: Total sample
Table 9 shows the transition matrix for South Africa’s labour market between 2008 and 2012. The 
matrices show the proportions of individuals who stayed in the same state, or, moved to the other five 
states, across the four years. The main diagonal shows the percentages of individuals who remained in 
a given state between 2008 and 2012.
Table 9: Transition matrix, 2008 and 2012: total sample
Total sample
U 12 N EA 12 FW E12 FSE 12 IW E12 ISE12
U 08 39.19 34.09 7.11 0.44 14.14 5.04
(1.67) (1.61) (1.01) (0.31) (1.22) (0.79)
N EA 08 26.10 59.91 2.21 0.26 8.61 2.92
(1.03) (1.17) (0.38) (0.14) (0.69) (0.40)
FW E08 7.98 12.66 67.23 3.20 6.22 2.71
(1.48) (2.04) (2.90) (1.18) (1.46) (1.03)
FSE08 14.64 8.41 5.32 47.65 13.20 10.78
(6.61) (3.13) (2.65) (8.89) (6.76) (5.10)
IW E08 19.63 34.35 10.09 1.18 30.79 3.97
(1.83) (2.35) (1.68) (0.49) (2.26) (0.77)
ISE08 17.52 36.10 6.25 3.16 10.38 26.59
(2.40) (3.31) (1.98) (1.15) (2.48) (3.11)
Source: Own calculations from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS- 2008 and 2012). Notes: The data are weighted using panel survey weights 
(w3_pweights) that account for between-wave attrition. Standard errors are in brackets. Sample restricted to adults aged 15-64 who responded in both 
waves. Row totals add up to 100.
The first thing to notice from the matrix is that the low levels of pjj for the labour market states, except 
formal wage employment and not economically active, imply that the majority of the subjects in each
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category move out of their initial labour market state. From 2008 to 2012, we observe that the formal 
wage employed are visibly the least mobile among all other labour market groups, with approximately 
67 percent of those who are initially formal wage employed remaining in the state. This suggests that 
churning between formal wage employment and other categories might not be very high. People with 
formal jobs tend to keep them. Transitions out of this state into informal employment are small which 
is consistent with the Dualist approach, which sees labour informality as a survivalist strategy when 
formal employment opportunities are limited. The largest category of workers who transition out of 
formal wage employment move into non-activity, which is a mere reflection of retirement or maternity.
The not economically active workers who make up most of the sample, exhibit low mobility, with about 
60 percent remaining in this state between 2008 and 2012. Most movers ended up in unemployment. 
Most of those who moved from being inactive into employment, ended up in informal employment with 
a majority of them wage employed. A negligible 2 percent moved into formal employment. The formal 
self-employed make up only 2 percent of the sample labour market. The outflows from this state are in 
decreasing order, into unemployment, informal wage employment, not economically active, formal 
wage employment and informal self-employment.
Informal wage employment shows high mobility with only 31 percent remaining in this state. Most of 
the workers who moved from this state ended up not economically active. Almost a fifth of those who 
were in this state in 2008 were now unemployed in 2012. The rest of the workers moved into formal 
wage employment, informal self-employment and formal self-employment, in descending order. The 
relatively larger proportion of workers who move into formal wage employment from informal wage 
employment appears to correspond to the standard queueing view. The transition from informal to 
formal employee may also be an outcome of better compliance by firms due to greater resources 
dedicated to enforcement by the state or a stricter penalty structure. The informal self-employed show 
the highest mobility rate among all labour market groups. Only about 27 percent of workers remain in 
this state across the four years. Similar to informal wage employment, most of the workers who move 
from this state, end up economically inactive while the rest transition into informal wage employment, 
formal wage employment and formal self-employment in descending order. Of important note is that 
for the two categories of informal employment, there is high risk of backward movement or churning 
into non-economic activity and unemployment, which is a mere reflection of the survivalist nature of 
these jobs. Transitions between the two categories of informal employment are small. Only about 4 
percent of workers transition from wage employment to self-employment, while the reverse transition 
is approximately 10 percent.
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The unemployed constitute almost a quarter of the total sample. Exhibiting relative mobility, the share 
of the sample, which remains in this state, is limited to about 40 percent. 34 percent of unemployed 
workers settle in non-economic activity. Since this study uses the broad definition of unemployment, 
this figure is quite high as it suggests that some of these workers have stopped ‘wanting’ to work. 
Approximately 8 percent of workers who transitioned out of unemployment, ended up in formal 
employment, with the majority in wage employment. The matrix shows that the most important 
transition for this study, which is that from unemployment to informal employment constitutes 20 
percent of the sample which was unemployed in 2008. Only 5 percent of workers who were unemployed 
in 2008 became informal self-employed in 2012, which is a mere reflection of barriers to informal 
entrepreneurship in South Africa. Most of the workers who moved from unemployment to informal 
employment were absorbed into wage employment (which includes casual work). Noteworthy is that 
those transitions from unemployment to informal employment exceed those from formal employment 
to informal employment.
The matrix shows huge movements into the NEA state across a number of categories. This may be a 
result of part of the sample becoming retirees between the two waves of the study. A different age limit 
might have curbed this ‘retirement effect’ in our transition analysis. Of specific importance to this study 
is a transition analysis of the workers by individual characteristics to examine which ones are 
influencing the movements, more specifically those from unemployment into informal employment. 
The parts below show the transition patterns by gender, age education, race, marital status and location.
Table 10 shows a transition analysis of 2008 -  2012 disaggregated by gender. The table shows that the 
transition proportions differ across gender lines. The proportion of workers who remain in 
unemployment increases to about 43 percent for males and reduces to about 37 percent for females in 
comparison to the total sample proportion. The proportion of workers remaining in non-economic 
activity reduces to 53 percent for males while it rises to 63 percent for females. The proportion of 
workers who remain in formal wage employment stays more or less the same across gender lines. 
Formal self-employment now becomes a relatively immobile state for males while it becomes more 
mobile for females. Informal employment remains very mobile, albeit exhibiting a higher mobility for 
males compared to females. This is consistent with the observation that women are more marginalised 
from formal employment (Welle and Heilman, 2005; Floro and Meurs, 2009; ILO, 2010) thus more 
likely than males to stay in informal employment.
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Table 10: Transition matrix, 2008 and 2012: by gender
4.2.1 Transition analysis: Gender
M ale
U12 NEA12 FWE12 FSE12 IWE12 ISE12
U08 43.27 23.47 11.81 0.12 14.73 6.60
(3 .13) (2.52) (2.27) (0.12) (2.11) (1.60)
NEA08 29.57 53.07 3.71 0.48 10.09 3..07
(1.81) (1 .99) (0.85) (0.37) (1.22) (0.64)
FWE08 6.76 10.99 67.82 3.73 7.40 3.29
(164) (2.47) (3 .69) (1.66) (2.07) (1.53)
FSE08 17.15 8.72 5.58 59.40 2.54 6.61
(10.82) (4.78) (3.77) (11 .93) (2.01) (4.36)
IWE08 20.59 33.88 13.26 1.77 23 .96 6.54
(2.97) (3.75) (2.98) (0.95) (3 .24) (1.57)
ISE08 22.84 23.47 10.24 2.88 14.71 25 .86
(4.49) (4.90) (3.95) (1.31) (4.82) (4 .72)
F em ale
U08 37 .38 38.78 5.03 0.58 13.88 4.34
(1 .95) (2.00) (1.04) (0.44) (149) (0.89)
NEA08 24.22 63.30 1.40 0.14 7.80 2.83
(1.24) (1 .42) (0.36) (0.07) (0.84) (0.52)
FWE08 10.28 15.82 66.11 2.20 3.99 1.61
(2.94) (3.59) (4 .67) (1.34) (1.51) (0.73)
FSE08 11.71 8.04 5.03 33.97 25.62 15.63
(6.31) (3.86) (3.71) (11 .63) (12.78) (9.46)
IWE08 18.81 34.74 7.39 0.67 36 .58 1.80
(2.27) (2.96) (1.75) (0.39) (3 .05) (0.51)
ISE08 13.42 45.81 3.18 3.39 7.05 27 .15
(2.40) (4.31) (161) (1.76) (2.18) (4 .11)
Source: Own calculations from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS- 2008 and 2012). Notes: The data are weighted using panel survey weights 
(w3_pweights) that account for between-wave attrition. Standard errors are in brackets. Sample restricted to adults aged 15-64 who responded in both 
waves. Row totals add up to 100.
An analysis of transitions from informal wage employment to formal wage employment from a gender 
perspective shows that males are more likely than females to make this transition (13 percent versus 7 
percent). An examination of transitions within the different types of informal employment (that is, from 
self-employment to wage employment and vice-versa) shows that males can easily make these 
transitions as compared to females. Transitions from unemployment to informal employment remain 
small across gender lines, with a larger proportion of males making this transition as compared to 
females (21 percent versus 18 percent). About 7 percent of males move from unemployment to informal 
self-employment while about 4 percent of females make this transition.
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4.2.2 Transition analysis: Age
Table 11 shows transition patterns by age categories. The proportion of workers who remain in 
unemployment is highest among the young workers. This concurs with evidence from Statistics SA 
(2014) which finds that in the aftermath of the global recession, a large number of South African youth 
than adults were unemployed and looking for work for one year or longer (long-term unemployed). A 
very large proportion of elderly workers remain not economically active as compared to other age 
groups. Formal wage employment is immobile amongst the middle-aged workers with almost 74 
percent of workers who were initially in this state remaining in it. Informal employment exhibits the 
highest mobility rates among younger workers. This group of workers exhibits a significant flow into 
formal wage employment between 2008 and 2012; thus, young workers may be using informal 
employment as a means of temporary or ‘bridging’ employment while they wait for formal jobs. Most 
of these youth could be engaging in casual jobs than be permanently attached to informal employment. 
Transitions from unemployment to formal employment are highest among the younger age group. The 
transition from unemployment into informal employment is more prominent for the middle-aged 
workers as compared to other age groups. About 23 percent of middle-aged workers, who were 
unemployed in 2008, make this transition. The elderly workers, however, had relatively more workers 
making a transition from unemployment to informal self-employment than other age groups.
4.2.3 Transition analysis: Education
Table 12 shows a transition analysis of South Africa’s working age population, by education categories. 
The proportion of workers who remain in unemployment is highest among the workers with higher 
education. About 48 percent of workers in this education category remain in unemployment. The 
workers with post-school and no matric exhibit the highest rates of immobility in the not economically 
active category, whilst workers with higher education show the least mobility in formal wage 
employment. The table shows that the group of workers who make the most transitions from 
unemployment to informal employment, including to self-employment, are those with no education. 
Approximately 42 percent of workers with no education make a transition from unemployment to 
informal employment with about 11 percent being self-employed. This transition is also hugely 
important for workers with a post school and no matric education. About 37 percent of this group of 
workers who were unemployed in 2008 were now in informal employment.
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Table 11: Transition matrix, 2008 and 2012: by age groups
U12 NEA12 FWE12 FSE12 IWE12 ISE12
15-34
U08 44.00 28.30 8.96 0.68 13.58 4.49
(2.11) (1.87) (1.33) (0.48) (1.57) (0.98)
NEA08 35.11 49.75 3.08 0.30 9.57 2.19
(1.40) (1 .47) (0.55) (0.21) (0.92) (0.42)
FWE08 8.92 10.89 65.52 4.99 6.34 3.34
(2.71) (2.54) (4 .89) (2.65) (2.30) (2.23)
FSE08 7.11 0.81 4.26 59.51 28.32 0.00
(7.00) (0.85) (3.51) (17 .39) (18.16) (0.00)
IWE08 24.33 26.24 16.46 2.35 24.62 6.00
(2.98) (3.38) (3.18) (111) (3 .29) (1.55)
ISE08 28.30 23.05 10.37 2.43 18.42 17.43
(5.51) (5.26) (4.54) (1.92) (5.45) (4 .42)
35-44
U08 32.68 40.12 4.50 0.00 16.95 5.75
(3.54) (3.90) (2.28) (0.00) (2.71) (1.71)
NEA08 20.75 55.92 0.38 0.60 14.26 8.09
(3.22) (4 .14) (0.27) (0.42) (2.82) (2.87)
FWE08 8.53 6.73 73.78 1.67 6.25 3.04
(2.59) (2.85) (4 .59) (101) (2.58) (1.68)
FSE08 20.88 0.50 23.70 40.45 4.66 9.81
(13.86) (0.52) (14.33) (15 .63) (3.47) (7.02)
IWE08 22.31 22.49 5.38 0.08 45.70 4.05
(13.86) (3.88) (1.72) (0.08) (4 .74) (1.29)
ISE08 11.40 26.76 6.88 4.23 8.20 42.53
(2.98) (5.32) (3.41) (2.49) (4.29) (6 .27)
45-64
U08 26.94 51.47 2.57 0.00 12.57 6.45
(4.07) (4.27) (1.47) (0.00) (2.52) (2.09)
NEA08 6.42 85.21 0.73 0.06 4.56 3.02
(0.97) (1 .49) (0.52) (0.06) (0.93) (0.60)
FWE08 6.14 21.70 61.99 2.62 6.02 1.52
(2.21) (4.96) (5 .50) (1.78) (2.76) (0.76)
FSE08 16.65 13.62 1.68 43.90 8.27 15.87
(9.96) (5.45) (1.71) (12 .51) (6.12) (8.25)
IWE08 10.12 57.84 5.34 0.52 25.28 0.91
(2.16) (4.21) (2.67) (0.31) (3 .40) (0.45)
ISE08 12.99 59.09 1.42 2.80 4.52 19.20
(3.16) (5.20) (1.23) (1.32) (2.00) (4 .21)
Source: Own calculations from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS- 2008 and 2012).
Notes: The data are weighted using panel survey weights (w3_pweights) that account for between-wave attrition. Standard errors are in brackets. 
Sample restricted to adults aged 15-64 who responded in both waves. Row totals add up to 100.
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Table 12: Transition matrix, 2008 and 2012: by education cohorts
N o ed u cation P ost school, n o  m atric
U12 NEA12 FWE12 FSE12 IWE12 ISE12 U12 NEA12 FWE12 FSE12 IWE12 ISE12
U08 11.80
(3.26)
46.45
(6.74)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
30.44
(6.68)
11.31
(6.60)
28.81
(9.01)
10.27
(5.23)
24.40
(10.92)
0.00
(0.00)
29.48
(9.88)
7.06
(5.01)
NEA08 10.20
(1.86)
80.36
(2.75)
1.24
(1.21)
0.00
(0.00)
5.97
(1.79)
2.23
(0.80)
11.75
(11.05)
88.25
(11.05)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
FWE08 0.00
(0.00)
31.01
(19.00)
65.93
(19.77)
0.00
(0.00)
3.05
(3.31)
0.00
(0.00)
10.79
(7.86)
15.33
(8.52)
34.61
(13.98)
17.30
(14.92)
21.98
(11.88)
0.00
(0.00)
FSE08 100.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
100.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
IWE08 13.54
(3.59)
48.33
(6.66)
48.33
(6.66)
0.00
(0.00)
33 .70
(6.26)
0.77
(0.61)
21.04
(13.43)
23.78
(14.60)
33.01
(16.45)
0.00
(0.00)
19.35
(16.63)
2.82
(2.23)
ISE08 6.34
(3.13)
55.93
(9.41)
55.93
(9.41)
0.00
(0.00)
12.36
(8.13)
25.36
(8.39)
5.38
(6.02)
78.12
(16.65)
4.99
(5.60)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
11.52
(12.24)
P rim ary  ed u cation H igh er ed u cation
U08 38.24
(3.74)
41.98
(3.68)
1.07
(0.45)
0.00
(0.00)
11.21
(2.05)
7.50
(2.34)
48.48
(8.71)
18.06
(6.78)
18.37
(5.34)
1.50
(1.08)
11.99
(5.56)
1.59
(1.15)
NEA08 18.92
(1.72)
70.81
(2.01)
0.34
(0.33)
0.09
(0.07)
6.92
(1.20)
2.92
(0.65)
12.53
(4.73)
52.69
(9.28)
13.93
(6.67)
0.60
(0.60)
14.00
(7.69)
6.24
(3.26)
FWE08 8.39
(3.16)
15.65
(5.26)
58.60
(7.95)
0.00
(0.00)
15.31
(6.47)
2.04
(1.07)
3.41
(2.02)
15.07
(4.69)
74.35
(5.41)
3.14
(1.56)
1.15
(0.82)
2.88
(2.38)
FSE08 47.36
(22.37)
18.29
(15.50)
0.00
(0.00)
8.98
(9.05)
0.76
(0.82)
24.61
(18.40)
0.00
(0.00)
5.93
(4.07)
9.26
(4.94)
69.05
(10.97)
6.46
(6.26)
9.30
(7.89)
IWE08 19.88
(3.68)
38.33
(3.97)
2.10
(1.34)
0.70
(0.42)
34.53
(4.07)
24.61
(18.40)
16.08
(7.24)
15.46
(9.35)
44.57
(15.02)
0.83
(0.86)
15.87
(12.27)
7.19
(4.23)
ISE08 22.14
(5.86)
38.99
(6.21)
3.13
(2.19)
1.30
(0.95)
7.91
(5.22)
26.52
(6.02)
17.93
(8.33)
34.07
(13.74)
20.36
(10.47)
12.10
(7.85)
0.00
(0.00)
15.55
(8.33)
Secondary ed u cation
U08 41.25
(2.03)
33.45
(1.98)
7.55
(1.28)
0.52
(0.44)
13.05
(146)
4.18
(0.81)
NEA08 31.77
(1.41)
52.88
(1.54)
2.60
(0.48)
0.35
(0.21)
9.48
(0.90)
2.92
(0.56)
FWE08 10.61
(2.40)
9.87
(2.39)
68.55
(3.90)
2.89
(1.53)
5.90
(2.01)
2.17
(110)
FSE08 26.29
(14.43)
10.05
(5.05)
0.80
(0.82)
25.80
(9.94)
26.15
(14.24)
10.90
(6.59)
IWE08 21.48
(2.61)
30.45
(3.32)
11.61
(2.10)
1.82
(0.91)
30.41
(3.13)
4.23
(118)
ISE08 17.51
(3.03)
31.04
(4.35)
5.99
(2.73)
2.87
(1.35)
13.34
(3.57)
29.25
(4.42)
Source: Own calculations from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS- 2008 and 2012).
Notes: The data are weighted using panel survey weights (w3_pweights) that account for between-wave attrition. 
Standard errors are in brackets.
Sample restricted to adults aged 15-64 who responded in both waves. Row totals add up to 100.
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4.2.4 Transition analysis: Race
Table 13 shows a transition analysis of the sample by race. The Asian/Indian sample has most of the 
workers who remain in unemployment across the four years. Whites are most immobile in non-activity. 
About 88 percent of Asian / Indians who were in formal wage employment in 2008 remain in this state 
in 2012, making them the most immobile race in the labour state. In terms of transitions from 
unemployment to informal employment, about 20 percent of Coloureds make this transition, which is 
the highest proportion of the total sample of workers who make this transition. Transitions into formal 
wage employment from informal wage employment were led by Whites with about 14 percent of them 
making the transition. Caution is advised for these interpretations since the samples are small and 
standard errors very large.
Table 13: Transition matrix, 2008 and 2012: by race
A frican A sia n  /  In d ian
U12 NEA12 FWE12 FSE12 IWE12 ISE12 U12 NEA12 FWE12 FSE12 IWE12 ISE12
U08 39.41
(1.72)
33.37
(1.65)
7.70
(111)
0.15
(0.07)
14.14
(1.28)
5.23
(0.83)
58.88
(16.46)
22.18
(12.19)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
18.26
(12.33)
0.69
(0.73)
NEA08 28.39
(111)
57.85
(1.20)
1.95
(0.33)
0.22
(0.15)
8.54
(0.68)
3.06
(0.41)
8.15
(4.71)
71.05
(10.59)
8.96
(7.76)
0.12
(0.12)
8.72
(7.75)
3.01
(2.99)
FWE08 9.14
(1.88)
14.69
(2.58)
64.53
(3.50)
2.14
(116)
6.25
(1.71)
3.26
(1.36)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
87.59
(8.80)
4.50
(4.51)
7.92
(7.68)
0.00
(0.00)
FSE08 29.14
(11.46)
7.43
(3.74)
10.60
(5.24)
26.83
(8.86)
17.15
(11.16)
8.85
(5.24)
0.00
(0.00)
48.03
(28.54)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
51.97
(28.54)
0.00
(0.00)
IWE08 21.36
(2.12)
29.82
(2.32)
10.27
(1.92)
0.87
(0.35)
33 .10
(2.49)
4.58
(0.94)
0.00
(0.00)
57.70
(22.67)
0.00
(0.00)
0.83
(0.91)
41.47
(22.69)
0.00
(0.00)
ISE08 18.53
(2.60)
34.03
(3.30)
6.35
(2.15)
2.62
(116)
10.95
(2.71)
27.52
(3.23)
8.70
(10.53)
87.42
(13.00)
0.00
(0.00)
3.88
(4.84)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
C oloured W hite
U08 32.46
(6.21)
38.86
(6.60)
3.66
(2.19)
4.83
(4.64)
16.01
(5.12)
4.18
(3.90)
34 .54
(14.14)
55.17
(14.69)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
6.85
(5.65)
3.44
(2.62)
NEA08 20.72
(4.09)
65.73
(4.54)
3.01
(146)
0.80
(0.60)
9.31
(2.84)
0.44
(0.40)
4.81
(2.60)
79.99
(6.30)
2.63
(2.59)
0.39
(0.29)
8.89
(4.80)
3.29
(3.22)
FWE08 14.71
(6.32)
13.23
(5.82)
65.82
(8.37)
0.00
(0.00)
6.16
(3.98)
0.08
(0.08)
1.23
(1.23)
7.75
(4.77)
73.26
(7.66)
9.08
(4.92)
5.69
(4.07)
2.99
(2.79)
FSE08 0.00
(0.00)
65.80
(23.97)
0.00
(0.00)
4.02
(4.33)
0.00
(0.00)
30.18
(24.09)
0.00
(0.00)
4.53
(4.39)
0.00
(0.00)
75.36
(12.04)
7.77
(7.50)
12.34
(9.48)
IWE08 16.47
(4.29)
48.23
(6.69)
9.78
(4.04)
0.48
(0.40)
23 .49
(5.38)
1.56
(0.75)
7.41
(4.81)
66.71
(14.11)
14.06
(9.69)
10.00
(9.56)
0.00
(0.00)
1.81
(148)
ISE08 18.08
(9.34)
46.75
(18.92)
7.35
(7.31)
0.00
(0.00)
6.20
(4.69)
21.61
(13.66)
6.69
(6.45)
46.95
(15.76)
6.14
(6.07)
10.80
(7.19)
6.87
(6.74)
22.54
(15.53)
Source: Own calculations from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS- 2008 and 2012).
Notes: The data are weighted using panel survey weights (w3_pweights) that account for between-wave attrition. Standard errors are in brackets.
Sample restricted to adults aged 15-64 who responded in both waves. Row totals add up to 100.
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4.2.5 Transition analysis: Marital status
Table 14 shows a transition analysis of the sample by marital status. The workers who are not married 
or not cohabiting are more persistent in unemployment relative to the ones who are married or 
cohabiting, while the latter group is more persistent in non-economic activity and formal wage 
employment. Transitions from unemployment into informal employment are led by workers who are 
not married or not cohabiting. About 20 percent of this group of workers make the transition. Transitions 
from unemployment to informal self-employment are however, slightly larger for the married and 
cohabiting workers compared to those who are not. Approximately, 12 percent of workers who are not 
married or not cohabiting make a movement from informal wage employment to formal wage 
employment between 2008 and 2012.
Table 14: Transition matrix, 2008 and 2012: by marital status
M arried  /  L iv in g  togeth er
U12 NEA12 FWE12 FSE12 IWE12 ISE12
U08 34.45 42.13 5.51 0.23 11.77 5.92
(2.84) (2.93) (1.68) (0.14) (193) (1.54)
NEA08 15.24 70.56 1.29 0.19 7.49 5.23
(1.67) (2 .19) (0.68) (0.10) (1.22) (1.14)
FWE08 6.15 13.03 68.24 4.07 5.35 3.15
(1.78) (2.85) (3 .80) (1.68) (1.72) (1.47)
FSE08 14.97 5.60 6.04 43.87 17.07 12.46
(8.78) (2.72) (3.59) (10.80) (9.36) (6.94)
IWE08 14.41 41.58 7.05 0.52 33.80 2.64
(2.53) (3.98) (1.88) (0.47) (3 .82) (0.90)
ISE08 15.49 38.05 6.48 4.24 9.60 26.14
(2.86) (4.61) (2.54) (1.83) (3.42) (4 .26)
N ot m arried  /  N ot liv in g  togeth er
U08 42.03 29.46 8.05 0.57 15.37 4.53
(2.06) (189) (1.27) (0.49) (1.55) (0.87)
NEA08 29.97 56.11 2.55 0.29 8.99 2.10
(1.24) (1 .36) (0.46) (0.18) (0.83) (0.37)
FWE08 11.21 12.34 64.79 1.83 7.80 2.03
(2.68) (2.73) (4 .58) (1.50) (2.66) (1.33)
FSE08 13.89 14.71 3.72 56.13 4.53 7.01
(8.37) (7.96) (3.03) (13.96) (3.60) (5.25)
IWE08 22.94 29.38 12.27 1.64 28.85 4.92
(2.52) (2.79) (2.50) (0.76) (2 .75) (1.15)
ISE08 19.64 34.06 6.01 2.04 11.20 27.05
(3.86) (4.75) (3.05) (1.35) (3.59) (4 .53)
Source: Own calculations from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS- 2008 and 2012).
Notes: The data are weighted using panel survey weights (w3_pweights) that account for between-wave attrition. Standard errors are in brackets.
Sample restricted to adults aged 15-64 who responded in both waves. Row totals add up to 100.
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4.2.6 Transition analysis: Urban/Rural location
Table 15 shows that the persistence of unemployment and non-economic activity is more or less the 
same for workers who resided in urban or rural areas. However, about 71 percent of urban residents 
who were initially in formal wage employment remained there across the four-year period compared to 
48 percent rural residents. In terms of transitions from unemployment to informal employment, about 
19 percent of workers from both the urban resident and rural resident sample, make the transition. 
Workers residing in urban areas make a larger movement from unemployment to informal self­
employment relative to those residing in rural areas. While only about 4 percent of workers residing in 
rural areas make a transition from informal wage employment to formal wage employment, about 14 
percent of those resident urban areas make a similar transition.
Table 15: Transition matrix, 2008 and 2012: by location
U rban
U12 NEA12 FWE12 FSE12 IWE12 ISE12
U08 39.75 31.84 8.66 0.65 13.27 5.83
(2.37) (2.29) (1.55) (0.51) (1.71) (1.20)
NEA08 25.17 59.56 3.16 0.50 8.80 2.81
(1.71) (1 .98) (0.74) (0.29) (118) (0.70)
FWE08 7.37 9.61 71.32 3.74 5.62 2.35
(1.65) (198) (3 .17) (1.43) (1.63) (119)
FSE08 14.95 8.46 4.44 48.68 15.17 8.29
(8.09) (3.75) (2.94) (10.84) (8.44) (5.84)
IWE08 17.77 32.95 13.86 1.72 30.85 2.85
(2.47) (3.24) (2.55) (0.77) (3 .15) (0.85)
ISE08 15.40 33.56 8.90 4.28 13.02 24.84
(3.18) (4.65) (3.05) (1.75) (3.75) (4 .25)
R u ral /  T raditional
U08 38.32 37.55 4.72 0.11 15.48 3.81
(2.16) (2.08) (0.92) (0.08) (1.62) (0.75)
NEA08 26.92 60.22 1.37 0.04 8.43 3.01
(1.21) (1 .33) (0.28) (0.03) (0.78) (0.45)
FWE08 10.81 26.69 48.43 0.74 8.97 4.36
(3.33) (6.18) (6 .42) (0.74) (3.31) (1.88)
FSE08 13.55 8.23 8.44 44.02 6.20 19.56
(8.90) (5.07) (5.85) (12.42) (6.00) (9.93)
IWE08 22.67 36.65 3.89 0.29 30.71 5.80
(2.63) (3.18) (1.20) (0.19) (2 .97) (146)
ISE08 21.06 40.36 1.80 1.30 5.97 29.51
(3.49) (4.22) (1.15) (0.93) (1.87) (4 .24)
Source: Own calculations from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS- 2008 and 2012).
Notes: The data are weighted using panel survey weights (w3_pweights) that account for between-wave attrition. Standard errors are in brackets.
Sample restricted to adults aged 15-64 who responded in both waves. Row totals add up to 100.
66
In conclusion, construction of transition matrices has helped us link labour market status of individuals 
in 2008 and 2012. Churning in South Africa’s labour market seems quite significant with most workers 
changing their labour market state between 2008 and 2012 thus concurring with earlier studies. 
Transitions from unemployment to informal employment constitute almost a fifth of the sample of 
workers who were unemployed in 2008; a majority of them being informal wage employed. Only 5 
percent of workers who were unemployed moved into informal self-employment. Transition matrices 
have also helped us to link worker movements between 2008 and 2012, with their individual 
characteristics in order to see which types of workers made more movements from unemployment to 
informal employment. The results showed that transitions from unemployment to informal employment 
were relatively larger for males, middle-aged and uneducated workers. There were also relatively larger 
for workers who are not married or not cohabiting. Transitions from unemployment to informal self­
employment were also notable for males, workers with no education, married or cohabiting and urban 
residents. A descriptive examination to see which sectors and occupations absorbed workers who 
transitioned to informal employment would have been interesting to assess whether most of them were 
in the ‘upper tier’ or ‘lower tier.’ However, because of the very few cases of workers, which make a 
transition from unemployment to informal employment, especially self-employment, as well as the 
many missing responses on sectors and occupations, such an analysis cannot be carried. To guard 
against spurious findings, the following chapter conducts a multivariate analysis to see if it will confirm 
the descriptive results.
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CHAPTER 5:
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
Chapter 4 has given us the transitional probabilities of worker flows in South Africa’s labour market 
between 2008 and 2012, including from unemployment into informal employment. In addition, the 
transition matrices helped us link these flows to a number of worker characteristics; however, they 
lacked in determining their magnitude. By using a probit regression approach, the current chapter 
complements the previous analysis and helps us to econometrically-estimate the impact of the various 
worker characteristics on the mobility patterns we have observed in the last chapter, with a pronounced 
interest on those from unemployment into informal employment. Following Verick (2012) and Essers 
(2013), 13 the estimated probabilities of individual transitions from being unemployed or economically 
inactive 2008 to different labour market states in 2012, the weighted marginal effects14 of the various 
individual characteristics on the transitions probabilities are estimated using the probit model. 
Henceforth, each parameter in the results tables below is interpreted as the survey-weighted percentage 
point difference in the probability of moving from unemployment (for table 17) or from unemployment 
or non-activity (in appendix); to another labour market state in 2012.
The worker characteristics considered in the probit regression model include gender, age, education, 
race, marital status and geography. For the purpose of the regression, the study adopts the following 
classifications:
• Gender, represented by female takes the value of 1 if the individual is a female and zero, if 
otherwise. Thus, in this case male is the base category.
• Age has been classified into three categories, which are the 15-34; 35-44 and 45-64 categories, 
with the 15-34 age category defined as the base category.
• Education: An individual’s level of education has been categorically classified according to 
levels of education completed, into no education, primary education, secondary education, post 
school, no matric; and higher education, with the no education treated as the base category.
• Race: An individual’s race has been categorically classified into African, Coloured, 
Asian/Indian and White, with the African race treated as the base category.
13 The margins, dydx () post estimation command of STATA is used, combined with the svy prefix, to calculate average marginal effects
14 A marginal effect (partial effect), most often measures the effect on the conditional mean of y of a change in one of the regressors, say Xk (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009: 333)
68
• Marital status: takes a value of one if the individual is married and/living together, while the 
widows/widowers, divorced/separated and those who were never married form the base 
category.
• Geographical location is defined as one if the individual resided in an urban area, and zero, if 
the individual resided in the rural area, aggregately defined as workers residing in traditional 
areas and farms.
For all variables included in X, each of the probability determinants are from the 2008 wave given that 
it is likely to be the initial situations of individual in 2008 which impact on whether that individual 
moves into another labour market state in 2012. Although the probit results for other transitions will be 
shown, special focus will be on movements from unemployment to informal employment. Movements 
to the informal employment state are examined first, then movements to the disaggregated components 
of informal employment; namely informal wage employment and informal self-employment separately. 
The marginal effects depict how the given explanatory variables influence the probability of leaving the 
initial state for a certain destination state.
Results of estimated transition probabilities from unemployment to unemployment, not economically 
active, formal wage employment, informal employment, informal wage employment and informal self­
employment, respectively between 2008 and 2012 are shown in table 16, with columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 
6 respectively showing each of these movements.15 For example, the first column of table 16 shows the 
probability of remaining unemployed between 2008 and 2012, while the second column shows the 
estimated probability of moving from unemployment in 2008 to being economically inactive in 2012. 
For the second probit estimates (shown in appendix 4), the table gives corresponding transition 
probabilities but for individuals who were either unemployed or economically inactive in 2008 to 
unemployment and inactivity, formal wage employment, informal employment, informal wage 
employment and informal self-employment respectively between 2008 and 2012.
Overall, the probit regression results corroborate the transition matrix results to a remarkable extent, 
except for a few cases. In this framework, gender is clearly ascertained to play a role in explaining 
persistence in unemployment between 2008 and 2012. In particular, unemployed women are 
significantly more likely to remain in unemployment compared to unemployed men as shown in column
15 Results for transitions from the unemployment and unemployment/not economically active category to formal self-employment are not shown because 
of the very small sample of individuals observed in the data who made the respective transitions.
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1 of table 16. This suggests that South African women have on average, poorer labour market outcomes 
as compared to men. Statistics SA (2013) reports that even educated South African women are not as 
well off as their male counterparts in entering employment. Regarding age, the results show that workers 
between ages 15 to 34 years are significantly more likely to remain in unemployment as compared to 
their older counterparts. In addition to this result concurring with evidence of youth long-term 
unemployment after the global recession (Statistics SA ,2014), this can also be evidence of the 
ineffectiveness South Africa’s controversial Youth Wage Subsidy (also known as the Employment Tax 
Incentive) that was implemented since 1 January 2014. In fact, a recent study by Finn and Ranchhod 
(2016) finds that the ETI did not have any statistically significant and positive effects on youth 
employment probabilities and has not resulted in an increase in the level of churning in the labour market 
for youth. Banerjee et al., (2008) identify two reasons for persistent high unemployment rates among 
young people: low outflows because searching is not very successful; and high inflows, because, for 
example, high-school dropouts go directly into unemployment and are likely to remain there. Kingdon 
and Knight (2001: 6) suggest that the young are more likely to search rather than be ‘locked-in’ to an 
undesirable job. The young are also more able to afford unemployed job-search because they have fewer 
financial commitments than do older workers. Moreover, they may be more ignorant about what their 
skills can command in the labour market, that is, they may have higher reservation wages than older 
workers.
The education variable seems to play an important role in remaining unemployed, with workers with at 
least some education significantly more likely to remain unemployed relative to those with no education. 
This is probably the effect of workers who have at least an education being more likely to remain 
searching for jobs or ‘wanting’ to work as compared to those without education, who have a lesser 
outlook on securing employment as they lack the human capital required by employers.
In terms of race, Whites are significantly less likely to remain unemployed compared to Africans. This 
in itself is evidence of poor labour market outcomes for the African population group. Leibbrandt et al., 
(2010: 43) suggest the inequality in terms of education attainment and quality across South African 
population groups that was left by Apartheid’s legacy, as a reason for persistent unemployment rates 
for Africans. Banerjee (2008: 45) points out the racial prejudice that exists in South Africa that leads to 
white employers’ unwillingness to give a chance to even qualified Africans.
As for the female-marital status interaction, the results show that married or cohabiting females are 
significantly more likely to remain unemployed compared to those who are not. Workers residing in
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urban areas are significantly more likely to remain unemployed compared to those in rural areas. This 
is probably a result of unfruitful job search for workers in urban areas; and workers in rural areas rather 
staying NEA because of the impossibility of search in homelands and the prejudice that they know 
employers have towards workers from rural areas.
In terms of movements from being unemployed to being economically inactive, the estimated results 
suggest that unemployed females are significantly more likely to make this transition relative to 
unemployed males. This evidence may be pointed to women’s traditional role as secondary 
breadwinners, maternity and other family responsibilities, which are likely to alter the urgency at which 
unemployed women seek employment (Kurtzleben, 2014). In terms of education attainment, workers 
with a secondary education are significantly more likely to move from unemployment to non-activity 
compared to workers with no education. This can be attributed to the former group of workers aspiring 
to continue with their education after failed job search. Workers with higher education are significantly 
less likely to move from unemployment to non-economic activity compared to those with no education. 
Asian / Indians and Whites are significantly less likely to transition from unemployment to non­
economic activity as compared to Africans.
Column 3 shows that elderly workers are significantly less likely to transition from unemployment to 
formal wage employment relative to youth. From the demand-side, employers may probably be less 
likely to employ workers who are almost reaching retirement and are seemingly less productive than 
the youth. Workers with primary education are significantly less likely to move from unemployment to 
formal wage employment, while those with post school and no matric education are significantly more 
likely to make this transition compared to those without an education. This suggests that formal 
employers are much less willing to employ workers with no education as they tend to be less productive 
and are a “risky” and costly investment; reflecting the importance of education in formal employment. 
Workers with no education tend to be a cost to a company, as they require more on-the-job training as 
compared to those with at least some formal education. Better levels of education are not only important 
from the employer’s side, workers with better education are also more effective in job searching and 
networking. It is however, important to note from the table that the sample size for this particular 
transition is very small therefore; caution is advised for this interpretation.
In terms of race, Coloureds are significantly less likely to transition from unemployment to formal wage 
employment compared to their African counterparts. Post- Apartheid, there has been a massive resource 
shift to African schools which has led to a reduction in schooling inequality (van der Berg, 2002: 3),
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thereby increasing employability o f Africans. Moreover, the removal o f labour market discrimination 
may also be a contributing factor enabling African workers to transition from unemployment to formal 
employment. The rows for Asians/Indians and Whites are empty, subject to there being no workers for 
these groups in the restricted sample, transitioning from unemployment to formal wage employment 
between 2008 and 2012 as shown in the matrices in chapter 4.
O f major interest to this study is column 4 o f table 16, which shows transitions from unemployment to 
informal employment. The results show that elderly workers are significantly less likely to transition 
from unemployment to informal employment as compared to the youth. This may be evidence o f utility 
maximising behaviour o f South African young workers who would rather earn a small wage and work 
in relatively bad conditions in informal employment, than remain unemployed and hope to earn a job 
in the formal sector. Workers with primary, secondary and higher education are significantly less likely 
to make a transition from unemployment to informal employment compared to those with no education. 
This suggests that transitions from unemployment into informal employment are more common for 
workers without an education since they are more marginalised from formal employment. From the 
employer’s side, workers with no education can easily be exploited compared to those with at least an 
education thereby they can be taking advantage o f this. In terms o f race, Whites are significantly less 
likely to make a transition from unemployment to informal employment compared to their African 
counterparts. This is probably a result o f generally better formal employment opportunities for Whites 
in South Africa. In addition, Africans can also be getting informal jobs through intergenerational links, 
for example, where most o f the family members are in unprotected jobs, it is easier for an unemployed 
member o f the family to get an informal job.
The results from the same column also show that married or cohabiting workers are significantly less 
likely to make a transition from unemployment into informal employment relative to those who are not. 
This can suggest that single/unmarried individuals can easily take risks associated with informal 
employment such as poor job security as the impact o f a lay-off is lesser compared to married or 
cohabiting workers who may have a child in the picture. Married or cohabiting workers can also be 
benefiting from the ‘spouse effect’ where the income from a working spouse reduces the incentive to 
be informally employed. The final observation from this column is that married females are significantly 
more likely to transition from unemployment to informal employment. This can be attributed to the 
attractiveness o f informal employment in terms o f its offering o f more flexible working hours to balance 
work and child-caring responsibilities for females. Gender and location are insignificant in influencing 
transitions from unemployment into informal employment.
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Table 16: Probit estimates for labour market state transitions 2008-2012 from unemployment in 2008
Variables
Remaining
in
Unemployment
U nem ploym ent to 
N ot Economically 
Active
Unemployment 
to Formal W age 
Em ployment
Unemployment 
to Informal 
Em ployment
U nem ploym ent to 
Informal W age 
Em ployment
U nem ploym ent to 
Informal Self 
Em ployment
Female 0.161** 0  4 5 4 *** -0.157 0.0852 0.154 -0 .1 1 1
(0.0686) (0.0767) (0.127) (0.0869) (0.0967) (0.129)
35-44 years -0.176** 0.0778 -0.267 0.0408 0.0823 -0.0726
(0.0806) (0.0848) (0.195) (0.0999) (0 .1 1 1 ) (0.153)
45-64 years -0.467*** -0.0437 -0.471** -0 314*** -0 333*** -0 .2 0 0
(0.0908) (0.0848) (0 .2 1 1 ) (0.109) (0.119) (0.177)
Primary education 0.583*** 0.139 -0.804*** -0.347** -0.398*** -0.177
(0.127) (0.0982) (0.185) (0.154) (0.153) (0.286)
Secondary education 0.622*** 0.186* -0.186 -0.339** -0.287* -0.380
(0 .1 2 1 ) (0.103) (0.147) (0.161) (0.158) (0.317)
Post school, no matric 0.631*** -0.262 0.499 0.231 0.296 -0.0315
(0.216) (0.240) (0.306) (0.240) (0.247) (0.423)
Higher education 0.363** -0.471** - -0.674*** -0.536** -0.922**
(0.171) (0.194) (0.236) (0.248) (0.374)
Coloured -0.197 -0.0928 -0.415* 0.0629 0.0180 0.134
(0.139) (0.117) (0.247) (0.164) (0.137) (0.411)
Asian/Indian 0.0209 -0.480* - -0.0607 0.0179 -0.560
(0.269) (0.266) (0.306) (0.316) (0.344)
W hite -0 543*** -0.341* - -0.808*** - 1 075*** -0.375
(0.207) (0.191) (0.217) (0.319) (0.260)
M arried/Cohabiting -0.113 0.0453 -0.0736 -0.270** -0.239 -0.261
(0.114) (0.116) (0.205) (0.128) (0.148) (0.187)
M arried/Cohabiting females 0.257** 0.192 0.169 0.370** 0.247 0.575**
(0.130) (0.130) (0.269) (0.155) (0.177) (0.228)
Urban 0.148** -0 .0 0 2 1 1 0 .2 0 2 0.0628 0.0163 0.171
(0.0649) (0.0713) (0.138) (0.0817) (0.0903) (0.132)
Constant -2.303*** -2.092*** -1 909*** - 1 .8 6 6 *** -1.855*** -3 532***
(0.184) (0.172) (0.300) (0.247) (0.233) (0.524)
Unweighted observations 704 6 8 6 99 331 253 78
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Source: Own calculations from NIDS 2008 and 2012
Notes: Average marginal effects based on survey-weighted binary probit regression where the dependent variable takes value 1 if individual moved to another labour market state from unemployment; and 0 if otherwise. 
Sample includes only adult panel members aged between 15-64 years in 2008. Survey design-adjusted standard errors in brackets.
Significance levels: ***1% **5% *10%. Omitted variables: male, 15-34 years, no education, African, not married/not living together, unmarried / not cohabiting females and rural.
Province dummies included, but coefficients omitted from table.
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Column 5 shows that elderly workers are significantly less likely to make a transition from 
unemployment to informal wage employment as compared to youth. Workers with a primary, secondary 
and higher education are significantly less likely to make this transition compared to those with no 
education. As a result of poor formal employment opportunities for workers with no education, they 
end up resorting to unprotected jobs as mentioned above. Moreover, workers with at least an education 
may be less willing to enter into informal employment as they may have higher reservation wages and 
job conditions compared to those without an education. Whites are significantly less likely to make this 
transition compared to Africans. Generally, South African Whites have better formal employment 
outcomes than Africans through better networks and education attainment.
Moving on to column 6, while this movement is the main interest of the research question, the results 
show that only a few variables have a significant power in explaining transitions from unemployment 
to informal self-employment, but limited by a very small sample size. Workers with a higher education 
are significantly less likely to make this transition compared to those without an education. As from our 
theory, workers with higher education tend to have better formal employment outcomes than those 
without an education and better education may increase the opportunity cost of informal self­
employment, as returns from salaried employment may be higher. Moreover, the stigma associated with 
informal self-employment for higher-educated workers is more compared to those without an education; 
therefore, the former would rather stay in unemployment waiting for a formal job offer. From a utility 
maximising perspective, rather than settling in unemployment, workers with no education who cannot 
get formal employment would rather start their own small businesses since their skills do not allow them 
to get ‘better’ jobs. Married females are significantly more likely to make a transition from 
unemployment to informal self-employment compared to those who are not. As from our theoretical 
framework, this is probably the result of financial support for start-up capital from a working partner 
and informal self-employment’s better flexibility in working hours. As regards to the latter, assuming 
that married females have children, informal self-employment can allow the mother to better divide 
household duties and work compared to formal employment or informal wage employment.
The table under Appendix 4 shows that while some variables are insignificant in influencing transitions 
from unemployment to informal employment, when the unemployed are combined with those who were 
not economically active, the variables now have a significant explanatory power. Notably, married or 
cohabiting workers become significantly less likely to transition into informal wage employment 
compared to those who are not. Married or cohabiting females become significantly more likely to
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transition into informal wage employment. Married or cohabiting workers become significantly less 
likely to transition into informal self-employment.
In overall terms, the results of this section show that a number of variables are significant determinants 
of labour mobility to informal employment. The uneducated, elderly African workers have a greater 
likelihood of making the transition into informal employment. This observation is therefore critical for 
policy making on informal employment in South Africa. Policy options obviously depend on the view 
that policymakers have towards informal employment. This will be discussed further in the following 
concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER 6:
CONCLUSION
The most distinct characteristic of the South African labour market is its high open unemployment rate, 
yet small informal employment that has failed to absorb much of the surplus labour as expected by 
traditional labour market approaches. Earlier studies claim to have found significant movement of 
workers between labour market states to also characterise the labour market, yet the share of informal 
employment to total employment is still minimal. Among other factors, barriers to mobility into 
informal entrepreneurship have been established to be a key reason why informality is relatively lower 
in South Africa compared to other developing countries. Worker transitions have however not been a 
focal question in explaining the small share of informal employment in the country. This thesis sought 
to examine which workers are able to enter informal employment, in the presence of barriers to entry. 
To answer this question, data from the NIDS 2008 and 2012 was used to construct transition matrices, 
which link individuals’ labour market states in 2008 and 2012. The transition matrices were done for 
the whole sample, and then separated in terms of 2008 demographic characteristics of workers, in order 
to examine which individual characteristics influenced the movements from unemployment to informal 
employment. To determine the magnitude, structure and determinants of these transitions, a simple 
binary probit model was used.
A general picture of the transitions showed that ‘churning’ across labour market states was quite high, 
confirming results by earlier studies. Formal wage employment was the most immobile state. This 
implies that formal wage workers turn out to be the most reluctant to leave their work, confirming the 
traditional theory which sees formal employment as the ultimate desirable labour market state. The not 
economically actives (who formed the largest category in the sample) showed negligible outflows, 
reflecting the rigid nature of the state and women preferring to stay out of employment. The matrices 
showed that mobility from unemployment into informal employment is small while mobility out of 
informal employment is high. The two categories of informal employment absorbed about 20 percent 
of the unemployed sample in 2012 with only 5 percent being informal entrepreneurs. This suggests that 
in contrast to the Dualistic narrative, informal self-employment has not proved to be a likely alternative 
for some of the unemployed and barriers to informality are non-negligible. Moreover, the higher 
mobility of unemployed workers to informal wage employment is likely evidence of ‘survivalism’ or 
bridging employment. There is a high risk of backward movement from informal employment into being 
unemployed or inactive which is a mere reflection of the temporary nature of informal employment.
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In the second phase of addressing the research question, two probit analyses were done. The first was 
constructed that only included workers who made a movement from unemployment to all other labour 
market states but with a focus on those who moved to informal employment. The second probit included 
workers who transitioned from both unemployment and inactivity. Transitions to informal employment 
were first done in its combined form and then separated into self-employment and wage employment. 
The results from the first probit regression suggested that the youth, uneducated, African workers are 
significantly more likely to make a transition from unemployment to informal employment. Moreover, 
single workers and married or cohabiting females are significantly more likely to make this transition. 
After disaggregating informal employment into its different categories, the results showed that youth, 
the uneducated and Africans are significantly more likely to transition from unemployment to informal 
wage employment. On the other hand, the uneducated and single or not cohabiting females are 
significantly more likely to transition from unemployment to informal self-employment. Evidence from 
the second probit estimates showed that married or cohabiting workers and married or cohabiting 
females are significantly more likely to transition into informal wage employment. Married or 
cohabiting workers are significantly more likely to transition into informal self-employment.
This thesis concludes by suggesting that informal employment, more precisely, self-employment in 
South Africa may not be an easy transition end-point for most unemployed workers. To date, policies 
to encourage informal sector entrepreneurship do not seem to have been successful. Better 
implementation of the current policies or better designation of new and relevant policies could enable 
more workers to transition from unemployment into informal entrepreneurship thus making this sector 
an avenue of income generation and employment creation. The paper reiterates and acknowledges that 
the various transitions estimated in the data resulted from a package of factors, some of which are 
unobservable (for example, availability of finances, managerial abilities, desire for independence and 
greater flexibility, utility maximising behaviour of individuals). In spite of this limitation, the results 
from this analysis are vital for both policy implementation and a viable foundation for further work on 
South Africa’s informal sector.
This research could be taken further quantitatively by comparing the income changes that were 
experienced by workers who transitioned from unemployment into either informal employment or 
formal employment in order to shed some light on whether these movements were more likely to be 
voluntary or involuntary movements as done in other panel studies mentioned earlier in the context 
section of the thesis. A qualitative study, which asks workers why they entered informal employment, 
or why unemployed workers did not venture into own-businesses would shed more light to the informal
78
employment picture in South Africa. A complementary study which includes other waves of NIDS 
(2010 and the recently released 2014 wave) would also provide a clearer picture on transitions into 
informal employment. In terms of the NIDS 2008 questionnaire, other variables (which are currently 
not available in the NIDS questionnaires) would have definitely added more flesh to the analysis on 
transitions to informal self-employment such as experience of workers as used in other similar studies 
such as Tansel and Kan (2012). The analysis has provided a very comprehensive and detailed diagnosis 
of informal employment in South Africa, which may help policy makers to produce various effective 
tools for addressing informality in the country.
South Africans typically hold two opposing views relating to informality: one is that it should be 
encouraged as an under-utilised source of employment, while the second one is that it should be 
discouraged as an inferior source of employment. The first view argues for policies that facilitate 
transitions from unemployment to informal employment, while the second one purports for those that 
facilitate transitions from informality to formality. Indeed, getting the unemployed into formal 
employment would be the ideal outcome; however this sector is clearly not able to absorb all work 
seekers, leading to a substantial and persistent broad unemployment rate. This thesis has found that 
transitions from unemployment to informal employment were more associated with workers who are 
generally marginalised from formal employment opportunities such as the young and uneducated 
African workers. This suggests that informal employment has the potential to promote inclusive growth 
through providing an alternative to unemployment when there are no alternative employment 
opportunities available particularly for these groups of people. Informal employment has also been seen 
to serve as a stepping-stone to upward transition into formal employment. Policymakers should 
therefore view informal employment in positive light, as it provides opportunities for employment and 
to a lesser extent, entrepreneurship; given the inability of the formal economy to absorb labour. Policies 
that reduce barriers to entry into informal entrepreneurship and encourage survival of informal 
businesses should therefore be readdressed. These include policies that address the skills gap in 
entrepreneurship and practical business management. Addressing these issues may mean going to the 
grassroots and improving the quality of education in predominantly ‘African’ schools. Government 
assistance through provision of basic infrastructure for small businesses, water and electricity are also 
viable policy options. There are also indicators that informal employment in South Africa has many 
aspects that reflect the Structuralist and Dualist theories. Policies need to be nuanced accordingly.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Employment in the informal economy and its components, selected countries, as 
percentage of non-agricultural employment
C ountry
[Y ear]
P e r s o n s  in  in fo r m a l  
e m p lo y m e n t
P e r so n s  e m p lo y e d  in 
t h e  in fo r m a l s e c to r
P e r s o n s  in  in fo r m a l 
e m  p lo y  m e n t  ou  ts id  e 
th e  in fo r m a l s e c to r
T h o u sa n d s
%  o fn o n -  
ag ricu ltu i al 
e m p lo y m e n t
T h o u sa n d s
%  o fn o n -  
a g r ic u ltu ra l 
e m p lo y m e n t
T h o u sa n d s
%  o f  n o n ­
a g ric u ltu ra l 
e m p lo y m e n t
M oldova, Rep. (2 0 0 9 ) 136 15.9 62 7.3 73 8.6
N am ibia  (2 0 0 8 ) 121 43.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
N icaragua (2 0 0 9 ) 1 .024 65.7 8 4 7 54.4 234 15.0
P ak is tan  (2 0 0 9 /2 0 1 0 ) 2 1 ,913 78.4 2 0 ,416 73.0 2,319 8.3
P anam a (2 0 0 9  Aug.) 517 43.8 3 2 7 27.7 192 16.3
P araguay  (2 0 0 9 ) 1.473 70.7 790 37.9 683 32.8
P e ru  (2 0 0 9 ) 7,458 69.9 5,223 49.0 2,313 21.7
P h ilipp ines (2 0 0 8 ) 15 ,150 70.1 15,680 72.5 2,490 11.5
R u ssian  Fed. (2 0 1 0 ) n.a. n.a. 7 ,785 12.1 n.a. n.a.
S erb ia  (2 0 1 0 ) 113 6.1 6 6 3.5 57 3.0
S o u th  A frica (2 0 1 0 ) 4 .089 32.7 2.225 17.8 1,864 14.9
Sri L anka  (2 0 0 9 ) 3 .184 62.1 2,588 50.5 597 11.6
T an zan ia  (2 0 0 5 /2 0 0 6 ) 3 ,467 76.2 2,353 51.7 1,137 25.0
T h a ila n d  (2 0 1 0 ) 9 ,642 42.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
T u rk e y  (2 0 0 9 ) 4 ,903 30.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
U g an d a(2 0 1 0 ) 2 ,720 69.4 2,344 59.8 537 13.7
U k ra in e  (2 0 0 9 ) n.a. n.a. 1,525 9.4 n.a. n.a.
U ruguay  (2 0 0 9 ) 572 39.8 4 8 7 33.9 141 9.8
V enezuela  BR (2 0 0 9  1 Q tr.) 5 ,131 47.5 3,920 36.3 1,275 11.8
V iet Nam  (2 0 0 9 ) 17.172 68.2 10.948 43.5 6,303 25.0
W est B ank & Gaza (2 0 1 0 ) 3 7 5 58.5 140 23.2 235 35.8
Z am bia  (2 0 0 8 ) 9 2 0 69.5 8 5 4 64.6 155 11.7
Z im b ab w e  (2 0 0 4 ) 9 0 9 51.6 6 9 8 39.6 n.a. n.a.
ILO (2013)
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Appendix 2: A summary of the dominant schools of thought on the informal sector
Dualists
Introduced by ILO W orld 
Em ploym ent M ission K enya 
1972
Sructuralists
Introduced by M anuel Castells 
and Alejandro Portes 1989
Legalists
Introduced by Hernando De Soto 
1989
Voluntarists
Introduced by W illiam  M aloney 
2004
Who they focus on Those engaged in  traditional and 
survival activities
Petty traders and producers; sub­
contracted workers; casual 
workers
Inform al enterprises and 
entrepreneurs
The self-employed, notably 
entrepreneurs -  especially male 
entrepreneurs and their inform al 
enterprises
How they view the economy As autonom ous activities w ith 
few (if any) links w ith  the rest o f 
the econom y; activities provide 
income for the poor and a safety 
net in  tim es o f  crisis
As subordinated econom ic units 
(informal enterprises) and 
workers that serve to reduce input 
and labour costs o f  large 
capitalist firm s and increase their 
com petitiveness
As com prised o f  plucky 
entrepreneurs who choose to 
avoid the unnecessary and 
burdensom e costs, tie and effort 
o f  form al registration and who 
need legal rights to convert assets 
into form al property
As com prised o f  entrepreneurs 
who choose to operate informally 
in  order to avoid taxation, 
com m ercial regulations, 
electricity and rental fees, and 
other costs o f  operating form ally
Causal theory Inform al operators are excluded 
from  m odern economic 
opportunities due to a) 
imbalances betw een the growth 
rates o f  the population and o f 
m odern industrial em ploym ent; 
and b) a m ism atch betw een 
people’s skills and the structure
Informality is due to the nature o f 
capitalism  and capitalist growth: 
specifically, the attem pts by 
form al firm s to reduce labour 
costs and increase 
com petitiveness; the reaction o f 
form al firm s to the pow er o f 
organized labour, state regulation 
o f  the economy (notably, taxes
A  hostile legal system  leads to 
inform al activities and informal, 
extra-legal norm s. Cum bersom e 
governm ent rules and procedures 
create barriers to form alization 
and thus stifle the productive 
potential o f  inform al 
entrepreneurs.
Inform al operators who choose to 
operate informally -  o r even 
crim inally -  after w eighing the 
costs and benefits o f  informality 
relative to formality. Unlike the 
legalist school, this school does 
not blam e the cumbersome 
registration procedures but says 
inform al is a deliberate choice by
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o f m odern economic 
opportunities
and social legislation) and global 
competition; and the process o f 
industrialization (e.g. off-shore 
industries, sub-contracting 
chains, flexible specialization).
entrepreneurs to enjoy benefits o f 
informality.
Characteristics 7 Characteristics:
- ease o f  entry
- reliance on  indigenous 
resources
- family ownership o f  enterprises
- small scale o f  operations
- labour-intensive and adapted 
technology
- skills acquired outside the 
form al school system
- unregulated and competitive 
markets
Focus on  relationships o f 
production + activities 
unregulated by the institutions o f 
society.
Informality seen as
• universal
• heterogeneous
• on  the rise
• systemically linked to 
capitalist/form al firms
A hostile reception, especially 
from  the legal system, leads to 
inform al activities and extra-legal 
norms.
Costs o f  becom ing formal:
registration + license
Costs o f  rem aining formal: taxes
+ com pliance w ith regulations or
laws + higher rates fo r public
utilities
Costs o f  illegality to economy: 
avoidance o f  fees and penalties 
+avoidance o f  taxes and labour 
laws
Costs o f  absence o f  good law  to 
inform al workers: 
not having property rights + not 
having enforceable contracts + 
not receiving benefits from  
form al sector
Costs o f  form ality (avoided): 
payroll taxes and social protection 
contributions
Benefits o f  informality: way to 
earn income while avoiding costs 
o f  formality
Policy responses Governments should create more 
form al jo b s and provide financial
Governm ents should regulate 
bo th  com m ercial and
Governm ents should introduce 
sim plified bureaucratic
Governm ents should bring 
inform al enterprises under the
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WIEGO (2015)
and business developm ent 
services to inform al enterprises
em ploym ent relations to address 
the unequal relationship betw een 
“b ig  business” and subordinated 
producers and workers
procedures to encourage inform al 
enterprises to register and extend 
legal property rights for the assets 
held by inform al operators in  
order to unleash their productive 
potential and convert their assets 
into real capital
form al regulatory environm ent in  
order to increase the tax  base and 
reduce unfair com petition by 
inform al enterprises
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Appendix 3: Definitions of dependent variables used in probit estimation
0 (base) = Male 
1= Female
Age categories 0 (base) = 15-34 years 
1= 35-44 years 
2=45-64 years
Education categories 0 (base) = No education 
1= Primary education 
2= Secondary education 
3= Post school, no matric 
4= Higher education
Race 0 (base) = African 
1= Coloured 
2= Asian/ Indian 
3= White
Marital status 0 (base) = Not married/Not living together 
1= Married/Living together
Marital interaction 0 (base) = Not married/ Not cohabiting female 
1= Married/ Cohabiting female
Location 0 (base) = Rural 
1= Urban
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Appendix 4: Probit estimates for labour market state transitions from unemployment and inactivity in 2008
Variables
Rem aining in 
Unemployment and 
Economically Inactive
U nem ploym ent and 
Economically Inactive 
to Form al W age Em ployment
U nem ploym ent and 
Economically Inactive 
to Informal Em ployment
U nem ploym ent and 
Econom ically Inactive 
to Informal W age Em ployment
U nem ploym ent and 
Economically Inactive 
to Inform  Self-Employment
Female 0.403*** -0.169* 0.0188 0.0619 -0.129
(0.0467) (0 .1 0 1 ) (0.0664) (0.0724) (0.0984)
35-44 years -0.546*** -0.435** -0.0250 -0.0348 0.0354
(0.0573) (0.182) (0.0777) (0.0822) (0.129)
45-64 years -0.0782 -0.456*** -0.258*** -0.332*** -0.00867
(0.0545) (0.148) (0.0818) (0.0937) (0 .1 2 1 )
Primary education 0.0457 -0.365 -0.207* -0.260** -0.0364
(0.0709) (0.380) (0.118) (0.126) (0 .2 0 2 )
Secondary education -0.135* 0.189 -0.216* -0 .2 2 0 * -0.152
(0.0725) (0.338) (0 .1 2 2 ) (0.127) (0 .2 2 1 )
Post school w ithout matric -0  7 7 4 *** 0.745* -0.00842 0 .0 1 1 1 -0.0838
(0.160) (0.430) (0 .2 2 2 ) (0.237) (0.366)
Higher education -1 141*** 0.396 -0.603*** -0.572*** -0.538**
(0.116) (0.347) (0.178) (0.196) (0.274)
Coloured -0.227*** -0.134 -0.00595 0.0140 -0.0797
(0.0849) (0.174) (0.140) (0.139) (0.337)
Asian/Indian 0.0538 0.199 0.0219 0.0446 0.0203
(0.181) (0.437) (0.262) (0.288) (0.364)
W hite 0.00165 -0.636* -0.180 -0.164 -0.161
(0.115) (0.358) (0.215) (0.246) (0.317)
M arried/Cohabit. -0  5 9 7 *** -0.133 -0.406*** -0.421*** -0.286**
(0.0702) (0.180) (0 .1 0 2 ) (0 .1 2 2 ) (0.137)
M arried/C females 0.523*** 0.0671 0 .4 7 2 *** 0.368** 0.611***
(0.0843) (0.236) (0 .1 2 2 ) (0.144) (0.162)
U rban -0.132*** 0.203* -0.0229 -0.0414 0.0250
(0.0448) (0 .1 1 0 ) (0.0657) (0.0736) (0.0898)
Constant -0.0917 -2.162*** -1 438*** - 1 416*** -2.863***
(0.116) (0.352) (0.191) (0.196) (0.365)
U nweighted observations 1,390 174 727 549 178
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Source: Own calculations from NIDS 2008 and 2012
Notes: Average marginal effects based on survey-weighted binary probit regression where the dependent variable takes value 1 if individual moved to another labour market state from either unemployment or non-activity and 0 if 
otherwise. Sample includes only adult panel members aged between 15-64 years in 2008. Survey design-adjusted standard errors in brackets. Significance levels: ***1% **5% *10%. Omitted variables: male, 15-34 years, no 
education, African, not married/not living together, unmarried females and rural. Province dummies included, but coefficients omitted from table.
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Appendix 5: Questions used to distinguish the formal and informal workers in the NIDS 2008 Adult 
Questionnaire, Section E (Labour Market Participation)
E1
em1
A re you currently being paid  a  w age or 
salary to w ork  on a  regu lar basis for an 
em ployer (that is not yourself) w hether full 
tim e o r part tim e? I f  you w ork for yourself, 
w e w ill ask  about th is later.
Yes 1
N o ^  SK IP TO  
E28
2
E12.5
em 1dedm ed
Is anything deducted from  your salary for 
m edical aid
Yes
1
N o
2
E12.6
em 1dedpen
Is anything deducted from  your salary for 
pension/provident fund contributions
1 2
E 12.7
em 1deduif
Is anything deducted from  your salary for 
UIF
1 2
E13.1
em 1contr
A re you em ployed on the basis o f  a  w ritten 
contract o r a  verbal agreem ent?
A  w ritten  contract 1
A  verbal agreem ent 2
E28
ems
H ave you engaged in  any self-em ploym ent 
activ ities during the last 30  days?
F or exam ple, you m ight buy and sell goods, 
be a  com m ercial farm er, w ork  for yourself 
as a  doctor o r hairdresser o r be a freelance 
consultant.
Yes 1
N o ^  SK IP TO  
E40
2
E37
em s tax
Is the  business registered for incom e tax  
and/or VAT?
Yes 1
N o 2
E40
emc
H ave you done any casual w ork  to  earn 
m oney in  the past 30 days?
Yes 1
N o ^  SK IP TO  
E45
2
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